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Ex parte Merryman
1
 is iconic. It is, arguably, the first major American case testing the scope 
of lawful military authority during war time. Not only during a war, but during a civil war. 
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1
 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.); 4 (pt. 1) A COLLECTION OF IN 
CHAMBERS OPINIONS BY THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1400–12 
(Cynthia Rapp & Ross E. Davies comps., 2004) (reporting Merryman). According to most 
commentators, Taney filed his Merryman opinion on June 1, 1861, after having announced rulings 
from the bench on May 27 and May 28, 1861. See, e.g., id. at 1400. But see ALLEN C. GUELZO, 
FATEFUL LIGHTNING: A NEW HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 224 (2012) 
(dating the Merryman opinion as of June 3, 1861); EMILY HARTZ, FROM THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
TO THE WAR ON TERROR: THREE MODELS OF EMERGENCY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 16 (2013) (asserting that Merryman was decided in “April 1861”); but cf. JEAN H., BAKER, 
AFFAIRS OF PARTY: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF NORTHERN DEMOCRATS IN THE MID-NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 158 (1998) (asserting that Merryman was arrested in “June 1861”). But compare Craig R. 
Military Law Review (forthcoming) 
http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/561/ 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629688 
01/11/2015 4:50  
DRAFT 
 
2 
Not only were the civilian (judicial) authorities in conflict with the military authorities, but 
the Chief Justice of the United States clashed with the President—or, at least, that is the story 
as it is commonly told.
2
 It is an 1861 case, but the stakes were large and, sadly, the issues 
remain relevant if not eternal.
3
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Smith & Stephanie J. Hurst, Lincoln and Habeas Corpus, in SILENCING THE OPPOSITION: HOW THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSED FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION DURING MAJOR CRISES 27, 34 (Craig R. 
Smith ed., 2d ed. 2011) (asserting the Taney’s “filed opinion . . . responded” to the position put 
forward by Attorney General Bates in his July 5, 1861 letter memorandum), with Suspension of the 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 90 (1861) (Bates, A.G.). Because it 
remains a matter of genuine doubt among sophisticated commentators what court decided Merryman, 
I have, throughout this Article, used “court” rather than “Court,” as the latter is usually reserved for 
the Supreme Court of the United States.  
2
 See, e.g., JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THIS MIGHTY SCOURGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CIVIL WAR 213 
(2007) (explaining that “the initial order to suspend the writ produced a confrontation between the 
president and the chief justice of the United States”); MARK E. NEELY JR., LINCOLN AND THE 
TRIUMPH OF THE NATION: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 64 (2011) 
(“The chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote the decision in May 1861, confronting the 
president of the United States less than two months after the firing on Fort Sumter.”); ERIC A. POSNER 
& ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 177 (2007) 
(“Justice Taney issued the writ of habeas corpus, forcing Lincoln to decide whether to obey the law or 
not.”); CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 20 (expanded ed. 
1976) (“At no other time in all the long history of the Court have a President and a Chief Justice . . . 
come into such direct conflict over an exercise of presidential power.”); 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1856–1918, at 90 (1922) (“Chief Justice Taney . . . was 
brought into direct conflict with the President, by his famous decision in Ex parte Merryman.”); 
Arthur T. Downey, The Conflict between the Chief Justice and the Chief Executive: Ex parte 
Merryman, 31(3) J. SUP. CT. HIST. 262, 262 (Nov. 2006) (“However, early in the Civil War period, 
the Chief Executive and the Chief Justice confronted each other in a direct fashion.”); Sherrill Halbert, 
The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by President Lincoln, 2 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 95 
(1958) (characterizing the Taney-Lincoln struggle over habeas corpus in Merryman as “titanic in 
character”); Phillip Shaw Paludan, “Dictator Lincoln”: Surveying Lincoln and the Constitution, 21(1) 
OAH MAG. OF HIST. 8, 8 (Jan. 2007) (“The event that inspired and legitimated these accusations [that 
Lincoln was a dictator] was Lincoln’s clash with the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
Roger B. Taney over the fate of Confederate sympathizer John Merryman.”); Donald Grier 
Stephenson, Jr., The Judicial Bookshelf, 37(3) J. SUP. CT. HIST. 335, 343 (Nov. 2012) (“With the 
sixteenth President and fifth Chief Justice, however, there was at least one occasion [i.e., Ex parte 
Merryman] where the conflict may fruitfully be seen as plainly Taney versus Lincoln.”); Jonathan W. 
White, The Trial of Jefferson Davis and the Americanization of Treason Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 
IN THE APPROACH AND AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 113, 123 (Paul D. Moreno & Johnathan 
O’Neill eds., 2013) (“[Chief Justice] Taney’s presence made Ex parte Merryman . . . a landmark 
decision.”); see also, e.g., BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, EX PARTE MERRYMAN AND DEBATES ON CIVIL 
LIBERTIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR 11 (Federal Judicial History Office 2007) (“[Taney’s] opinion 
without a decision was more of a political challenge to the President than a constitutional standoff 
between two branches of government . . . .”), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/docs/merryman.pdf.  
3
 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Merryman); 
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 47 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result) (same); Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 31 n.55 (1957) (Black, J., judgment of the Court) (same); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 631 n.1 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring) (same); id. at 637 n.3 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (same); LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL32458, 
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However, the standard restatement of the facts, reasoning, and disposition of Ex parte 
Merryman appearing in many (if not most) law review articles is wrong. Moreover, these 
mistakes are not unique to academic lawyers; a fair number of judges, historians, and 
academics in allied fields make the same or very similar mistakes. These repeated errors are 
somewhat surprising because Merryman is, if not a leading case, only one short step removed 
from the received case law canon. To put it another way, what is frequently written about 
Merryman is a series of myths. This Article seeks to disentangle Merryman’s many myths 
from reality. 
I. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Following the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, the parade of state secession would begin. 
By April 1861, Fort Sumter had fallen. Even Washington, the nation’s capital, was threatened 
by Confederate armies, disloyal state militias, and irregular combatants, not to mention 
disloyal civilians, assassins, and spies.
4
 To secure the capital, President Lincoln directed 
Union troops to proceed to Washington through Maryland, a border state. Mobs in Maryland 
had attacked Union troops; bridges and railway lines had been destroyed; telegraph wires to 
the capital had been cut. It appears that the purpose of the greater part of this destruction was 
to prevent Union troops from passing through Maryland to secure Washington and, perhaps, 
also federal military installations in Maryland, such as Fort McHenry in Baltimore. On April 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
MILITARY TRIBUNALS: HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND LESSONS CRS-22 to CRS-23 (2004) (same); 
Memorandum from E.F. Smith, Assistant Attorney General to W.P. Hobby, Governor of Texas, Op. 
No. 2238, Bk. 53, 1920 Tex. AG LEXIS 34, at *34 (1920) (same); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 223 (4th ed. 2000) (same). Westlaw 
reports that Merryman is cited in: (i) eighteen federal court opinions; (ii) four state court opinions; 
(iii) three hundred ninety seven domestic secondary sources; (iv) fifty three appellate court filings 
(including many filings in recent War on Terror detainee litigation); (v) nine trial court filings 
(including several filings in recent War on Terror detainee litigation); and (vi) three foreign secondary 
sources. See Keycite to Ex parte Merryman (accessed Oct. 15, 2015). Likewise, Westlaw reports, also 
as of Oct. 15, 2015, twelve legislative documents citing Merryman in the US GAO Federal 
Legislative Histories library.  
4
 See MCPHERSON, supra note 2, at 213 (noting that “Confederates and guerrillas were numerous” in 
border slave states); MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN 
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 66 (2003) (asserting that 
“Confederate partisans . . . were common in the border states”); JOHN BRADLEY WINSLOW, THE 
STORY OF A GREAT COURT: BEING A SKETCH HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 189 
(1912) (explaining that in March 1861, Lincoln found Washington “filled with . . . disunionists and 
honeycombed with plots”); Halbert, supra note 2, at 106 (“The real problem was to be found in the 
group of people who, by word and conduct, sought to undermine the war effort and destroy the morale 
of the people. They were the fifth columnists of their day.”); Stephen T. Schroth et al., Lincoln, 
Abraham (Administration of), in 3 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: 
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1009, 1011 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012) (noting threat of “independent militias 
hostile to the Union cause” at the time Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus); see also J.G. 
HOLLAND, HOLLAND’S LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Bison Books 1998) (Springfield, Mass., Gurdon 
Bill 1866) (noting that circa 1863, “[n]othing was more notorious than that the country abounded with 
spies and informers”); cf. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 287 (1988) (“Union 
officials . . . continued to worry about underground confederate activities in Baltimore.”). But cf. id. at 
287 (suggesting that Merryman’s arrest was an “overreact[ion]” by U.S. Army officers).  
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4 
27, 1861, in order to secure the movement of Union troops through Maryland, Lincoln issued 
an order delegating authority to General Winfield Scott to suspend habeas corpus. Lincoln’s 
order cited no statutory basis for his decision.  
 
John Merryman was from a long-established land-owning politically-connected Maryland 
family, as was his wife. At the outbreak of the Civil War, he had already been elected to 
public office: member and president of the Baltimore County Commission.
5
 Rightly or not, 
military authorities suspected John Merryman of being an officer of a pro-secession militia 
group which allegedly had conspired to destroy and destroyed bridges and railway lines.
6
 As 
                                                             
5
 See BRIAN MCGINTY, THE BODY OF JOHN MERRYMAN: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SUSPENSION 
OF HABEAS CORPUS 59 (2011) (describing Merryman’s election to the Baltimore County 
Commission). But cf. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 845 (1974) (describing 
Merryman as a “member of the state legislature” at the time of or prior to his arrest). I have doubts as 
to Swisher’s claim here; the prevailing view among modern commentators is that, prior to the Civil 
War, Merryman had run unsuccessfully for a state legislative seat. See MCGINTY, supra at 60 
(discussing Merryman’s failed 1855 campaign for a state legislative seat); see also Francis B. Culver, 
Merryman Family, 10(3) MD. HIST. MAG. 286, 296–97 (Sept. 1915). Admittedly, some contemporary 
commentators have adopted Swisher’s position. See, e.g., HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
146 (2005) (describing Merryman as a “state legislator” at the time of his arrest); LUCAS A. POWE, 
JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 118–19 (2009) (same); 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 26 (1998) (same); 
JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT’S 
WAR POWERS 186 (2006) (asserting that Merryman was a “state legislator,” and stating that 
Merryman’s home was Cockneysville, Maryland, when it was Cockeysville, Maryland); James F. 
Simon, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney, 35(3) J. SUP. CT. HIST. 225, 236 (Nov. 2010) (affirming that, 
prior to or at the time of his arrest, Merryman was a state legislator); Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties 
and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1359 & n.48 
(1993) (reviewing MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES (1991)) (“Merryman was a member of the Maryland legislature . . . .” (citing SWISHER, 
supra at 844–45)). Swisher also reports that Merryman’s father “and Chief Justice Taney had attended 
Dickinson College in the same period.” SWISHER, supra at 845 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding 
Swisher’s offering no sources in support of his claim, other commentators have repeated and 
expanded upon it. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of 
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 90 n.27 (1993) (“Swisher 
notes that Merryman’s father and Taney attended Dickinson College together.” (emphasis added) 
(citing SWISHER, supra at 845)); John Yoo, Lincoln and Habeas: of Merryman and Milligan and 
McCardle, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 505, 513 (2009) (“Carl Swisher reports that Merryman’s father and 
Taney had gone to Dickinson College together.” (emphasis added) (citing SWISHER, supra at 845)). 
Interestingly, Dickinson College has no record of Merryman’s father, Nicholas Rogers Merryman, 
attending. See Jonathan W. White, The Trials of John Merryman and Abraham Lincoln’s Other 
Habeas Corpus Problem, ABRAHAM LINCOLN INSTITUTE’S LINCOLN SYMPOSIUM LECTURE (Mar. 26, 
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAQGiwmBsLo (noting that “the archivist at Dickinson” 
could find “no record of Merryman’s father ever being there”) (at 38:56ff). In a contemporaneous 
report, The New York Times asserted that Merryman was Taney’s “neighbour” and “personal friend.” 
Taney and Cadwallader, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1861, 4–5, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1861/05/29/news/taney-and-cadwallader.html. 
6 See MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 62–63, 67–68, 169, 172; Jonathan W. White ed., Research Notes & 
Maryland Miscellany, A New Word from Roger B. Taney on the Suspension of Habeas Corpus, 107(3) 
MD. HIST. MAG. 359, 359 (Fall 2012); see also Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and 
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the Civil War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 928–29 (1997) (“Merryman [was] 
suspected [by the authorities] of being a major actor in the dynamiting [?] of the railroad bridges.”); 
cf. Eric M. Freedman, Book Review, 99(3) J. AM. HIST. 929, 929 (2012) (reviewing BRIAN MCGINTY, 
THE BODY OF JOHN MERRYMAN (2011), and JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND 
TREASON IN THE CIVIL WAR (2011)) (“As Union troops rushed to Washington, D.C., in April 1861, 
many Southern sympathizers violently opposed their passage.”); infra note 75 (discussing 
Merryman’s alleged involvement in regard to destroying telegraph wires). But cf. CARL BRENT 
SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 112 (1930) (characterizing Merryman as a 
“Southern agitator” and asserting, absent any authority, that he was “arrested by military 
authorities . . . on the ground that his utterances were a hindrance to the Northern cause”). According 
to some, Merryman destroyed the bridges under orders from Governor Hicks. See HAROLD H. BRUFF, 
UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 134 (2015) (“Both the 
governor of Maryland and the mayor of Baltimore had authorized burning bridges to keep federal 
troops out.”); 4 STATES AT WAR: A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR DELAWARE, MARYLAND, AND NEW 
JERSEY 499 n.320 (Richard F. Miller ed., 2015) (“In this capacity [as a militiaman], under orders 
(depending on the version, from [Governor] Hicks or someone else), Merryman helped burn railroad 
bridges . . . .”); George W. Liebmann, The Mayor and the President: A Re-examination of Merryman, 
25(2) SUPREME COURT HIST. SOC. QUARTERLY 10, 10 (2013) (asserting that Merryman acted under 
instructions from the mayor of Baltimore, with Governor Hicks’ acquiescence); Bart Talbert, Book 
Review, 75(1) HIST. 176, 177 (Spring 2013) (reviewing JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
AND TREASON IN THE CIVIL WAR (2011)) (“[Merryman] was acting under orders of the then-state 
authorities, who wished to prevent further clashes between Maryland’s pro-Southern majority and 
Northern militia units heading to Washington.”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi, The Right to buy Health 
Insurance Across State Lines: Crony Capitalism and the Supreme Court, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1447, 
1477 (2013) (characterizing Merryman as a “Confederate terrorist”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil 
Liberties in Wartime, 28(3) J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215, 220 (Nov. 2003) (characterizing Merryman as a 
“Confederate cavalryman”). But see MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 156 (explaining that “Governor Hicks 
strenuously denied that he had ever given or even approved such orders [approving of the destruction 
of bridges and telegraph wires]”). Calabresi’s and Stone’s characterizing Merryman as a 
“Confederate” is unsupported, as is Talbert’s characterization of Maryland having a “pro-Southern 
majority.” See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 4, at 287 (“Unionist candidates won all six 
seats in a special [Maryland] congressional election on June 13 [1861]. By that time the state had also 
organized four Union regiments. Marylanders who wanted to fight for the Confederacy had to depart 
for Virginia to organize Maryland regiments on Confederate soil.”); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 18 
(“Maryland teetered both geographically and ideologically between North and South.”); id. at 20 
(describing “delicate balance of opinion” in Maryland); id. at 24 (explaining that “Governor [Hicks] 
urged the legislature to preserve its ‘neutral position’ between the North and the South”); JOHN E. 
SEMONCHE, KEEPING THE FAITH: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 103 (1998) 
(characterizing Maryland, at the time of Merryman, as “bitterly divided”). Compare CAROL BERKIN 
ET AL., MAKING AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 333–34 (7th ed. 2008) (“The 
[Maryland] state legislature . . . met [in 1861] and voted to remain neutral.”), and MCPHERSON, 
BATTLE CRY, supra note 4, at 287–89 (explaining that Lincoln did not order the arrest of disunionist 
members when the Maryland legislature met in May 1861 and voted for neutrality, but “Lincoln 
decided to take drastic action” in September 1861—i.e., several months after Merryman had been 
adjudicated—and at this time thirty-one secessionist members were arrested by the military), with 
MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 14–18 
(1991) (discussing conflicting historical claims in regard to alleged secessionist members of the 
Maryland legislature, and explaining that the U.S. military precluded some of those members from 
attending the state legislature and that the military arrested other members); compare HARTZ, supra 
note 1, at 6 (characterizing Merryman as a “civilian”), 1 OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB II, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SOURCES OF POWER AND RESTRAINT 197 (4th ed. 2008) (same), 
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6 
a result, on Saturday, May 25, 1861, federal military authorities arrested Merryman, and they 
subsequently detained him at Fort McHenry. The same day—Saturday, May 25, 1861—
Merryman’s Maryland counsel, George M. Gill and George H. Williams, brought 
Merryman’s habeas corpus petition to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney at Taney’s 
Washington home.
7
 On or about Sunday, May 26, 1861, the Chief Justice issued an ex parte 
order directing General George Cadwalader, the Army officer having overall command of the 
military district including the Fort: (i) to appear before Taney the next day—on Monday, 
May 27, 1861 at 11:00 am—in a court room in Baltimore; (ii) to explain the legal basis for 
Merryman’s detention by military authorities; and (iii) to “produce”
8
 the body of John 
Merryman at that hearing.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and Lewis S. Ringel, Freedom Challenged: Due Process of Law During War, in 4 WHITE HOUSE 
STUDIES COMPENDIUM 207, 210 (Robert W. Watson ed., 2007) (same), with Steven G. Calabresi & 
Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 667, 726 (2003) (characterizing Ex parte Merryman as “ar[i]s[ing] when [John Merryman] an 
officer in the Maryland militia was placed in military custody for allegedly using his position to 
recruit and train Confederate sympathizers” (emphasis added)). See generally Ex parte Merryman, 17 
F. Cas. at 144 (explaining that “[a] military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person [such as 
Merryman] not subject to the rules and articles of war, for an offence against the laws of the United 
States, except in aid of the judicial authority, and subject to its control” (emphasis added)). 
7
 See Downey, supra note 2, at 262–63 & n.3 (explaining that the petition was presented to Taney on 
Saturday, May 25, 1861, and also explaining other key dates); id. at 262 (explaining that Merryman’s 
petition was presented to “Taney at his home in Washington”); Simon, supra note 5, at 236 (noting 
that the “petition was delivered to Chief Justice Taney on . . . the same day that Merryman was 
imprisoned” (emphasis added)). But see MAROUF HASIAN JR., IN THE NAME OF NECESSITY: 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE LOSS OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 91 (2005) (Merryman “had the 
good fortune of applying for [habeas corpus] at a time when Chief Justice Roger Taney was riding 
circuit in the area.”); MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 57 (2000) (“Merryman filed for a writ of habeas 
corpus with the U.S. Court of Appeals in Maryland . . . .”); EDGAR J. MCMANUS & TARA HELFMAN, 
LIBERTY AND UNION: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 204 (concise ed. 2014) 
(“Merryman applied to Chief Justice Taney, who was then on circuit court duty in Maryland . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); JUDGE ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, SUICIDE PACT 44 (2014) (“Merryman’s attorney 
sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal court in Baltimore.”); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 18 
(stating that “[t]he petition was presented to Chief Justice Taney on Sunday”); ROSS, supra note 4, at 
67 (“[Merryman] filed a habeas corpus petition at the Baltimore circuit court . . . .”); Jeffrey D. 
Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 11, 17 (2004) (“Merryman’s 
attorney then went to Washington, where he presented a petition for [a] writ of habeas corpus to Chief 
Justice Taney in chambers at the Supreme Court.” (emphasis added)); Harold L. Kaplan, 
Constitutional Limitations on Trials by Military Commissions, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 272, 288 (1944) 
(“Application was made to Chief Justice Taney of the United States Supreme Court while he was 
sitting in the United States Circuit Court at Baltimore for a writ of habeas corpus.”); Stone, supra note 
6, at 220 (“The judge assigned to hear Merryman’s petition was Chief Justice Roger B. Taney.” 
(emphasis added)); cf. Senator Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 
38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 80 (2015) (asserting that Taney was “sitting by designation”).  
8
 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144 (illustrating that the petition seeking habeas used “produce” 
language); id. (reporting Taney’s ex parte order as directing Cadwalader to “have with you the body” 
of John Merryman “at eleven o’clock in the morning” on May 27, 1861); id. (quoting Taney, at the 
May 27, 1861 hearing, as stating “General Cadwalader was commanded to produce the body of Mr. 
Merryman before me”); id. (using “produce the body” language in the attachment order which went 
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Cadwalader did not attend the May 27, 1861 hearing; instead, he sent Colonel R. M. Lee. At 
the hearing, Colonel Lee presented the court with a signed response from Cadwalader laying 
out the General’s defense, i.e., arguing that habeas corpus had been lawfully suspended under 
presidential authority. Cadwalader’s response also sought a postponement to seek additional 
direction from the President if the court should determine that Cadwalader’s defense was 
insufficient. Furthermore, Cadwalader did not produce Merryman at the hearing as he was 
instructed to by Taney’s ex parte order.  
 
Because Cadwalader failed to produce Merryman, Taney directed the United States Marshal 
to serve an attachment for contempt on Cadwalader. The Marshal sought to serve the 
attachment on the morning of Tuesday, May 28, 1861 at Fort McHenry. But the Marshal was 
not admitted. Many at the time, including perhaps Chief Justice Taney, and others since, 
believed and continue to believe that this was a Cromwellian civil-military confrontation. In 
other words, the military authorities prevailed, not as a matter of established legal right as 
determined by the courts, but because the Army (which was acting under the direction of the 
President) had greater fire power than the United States Marshal (who was serving the 
attachment order under instructions from the Chief Justice).  
 
Prior to noon on May 28, 1861, the Marshal returned to the courthouse, without Cadwalader 
(and also without Merryman). Taney delivered an oral opinion later that day, and this ended 
live proceedings in court. On June 1, 1861, Taney filed an extensive written opinion. The 
written opinion was filed with the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland.  
 
In his opinion, Taney expressed the view that the President has no unilateral power to 
suspend habeas corpus. In other words, under the Constitution, only Congress can suspend 
habeas corpus. He also took the position that: “A military officer has no right to arrest and 
detain a person not subject to the rules and articles of war, for an offence against the laws of 
the United States, except in aid of the judicial authority, and subject to its control.”
9
 For those 
reasons, he concluded: “It is, therefore, very clear that John Merryman, the petitioner, is 
entitled to be set at liberty and discharged immediately from imprisonment.”
10
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
unserved on Cadwalader). To be clear, Taney’s initial writ of habeas corpus to produce Merryman 
was issued and successfully served on Cadwalader on May 26, 1861, but that document should not be 
confused with the subsequent attachment order which went unserved on May 28, 1861. But see 
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 120 n.55 (enlarged ed. 1974) 
(“The commanding officer rejected service of a writ of habeas corpus and stated that the President had 
authorized him to suspend the writ at his discretion.”); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 37 (1924) (explaining that, in Merryman, “Chief Justice Taney . . . vainly 
attempt[ed] to serve the writ”); ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES 
OF NATIONAL CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVVE 51 (2011) (conflating the 
two judicial orders, asserting that the May 26, 1861 order was not successfully served, and asserting 
that Merryman was housed in “Fort Henry”); THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CIVIL WAR DESK 
REFERENCE 144 (Margaret E. Wagner et al. eds., 2002) (explaining that Taney “issue[d] a writ of 
habeas corpus on May 27 for Merryman’s release”); ROSS, supra note 4, at 67 (dating the ex parte 
order to produce Merryman as on May 28, 1861).  
9
 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144.  
10
 Id. 
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Noting that his attachment order “ha[d] been resisted by a force too strong for me to 
overcome,”
11
 Taney’s final judicial order did not command Cadwalader or anyone else to 
release Merryman. Instead, Taney’s final order merely meekly directed the Clerk of the 
Circuit Court for the District of Maryland to transmit a copy of the proceedings and his 
opinion to President Lincoln, where it would “remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his 
constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine what 
measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and 
enforced.”
12
 
 
Merryman was not released as a consequence of Taney’s decision, nor was he brought before 
a military tribunal. Instead, he was transferred to the federal civil authorities, and indicted for 
treason in the District Court for Maryland on July 10, 1861. He was released on bail on or 
about July 13, 1861. There was considerable procedural wrangling and delay. The treason 
case—in any one of several different procedural incarnations—stretched into the future, past 
the end of the war itself. In 1867, the United States Attorney entered a nolle prosequi—as a 
result, Merryman was never brought to trial.
13
  
                                                             
11
 Id. at 153. It is possible that Taney’s language here also referred to Cadwalader’s failing to produce 
John Merryman at the initial hearing.  
12
 Id. (quoting United States Constitution Article II, Section 3 (Take Care Clause)); see, e.g., STEPHEN 
C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 36 (2010) (“[Taney’s] 
opinion concluded in a diplomatic (if not quite a conciliatory) vein, with an invitation to the President 
to defuse the crisis. Perhaps, Taney speculated, General Cadwalader had exceeded his instructions, 
thereby relieving the President of any personal blame.” (emphasis added)). An “invitation” is not an 
order. But see JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND 
THE COMING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (2009) (characterizing Cadwalader’s response as a 
“rebuke[]”).  
13
 See, e.g., MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 168–70 (explaining that Merryman was indicted for treason, 
but never tried); RAGSDALE, supra note 2, at 8–9, 12–13 (describing charges as conspiracy and 
treason); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 39 (describing multiple charges, including “conspiracy to 
commit treason”); see also JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 120–
27 (1926). See generally Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. passim. But see TOM HEAD & DAVID 
WOLCOTT, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 88 (2010) (“[A]fter seven weeks of imprisonment, 
Merryman was abruptly released, no charges having ever been filed to justify his arrest in the first 
place.”); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR 
POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 121–22 (2d ed. 1989) (“Merryman had either been 
released or was in the custody of the judicial [?] authorities. He was not indicted.”); id. at 120 
(asserting that Merryman had been transferred to the civil authorities on May 25, 1861, and that at the 
time “Cadwalader made return” to the initiail ex parte writ, he was “[u]naware that he no longer held 
the petitioner”); but cf. AMANDA DIPAOLO, ZONES OF TWILIGHT: WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
AND FEDERAL COURT DECISION MAKING 50 (2010) (asserting that, in Merryman, “[a] trial for treason 
took place”). DiPaolo also reports that prior to Merryman’s arrest, Lincoln “replaced Maryland’s 
civilian courts with military commissions.” Id. But DiPaolo offers no support for her factual claims. 
See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 50 (“[N]one of the civilians apprehended during [Secretary of 
State] Seward’s [early] tenure were tried for any offense before a military commission; this procedure 
came only under [Secretary of War] Stanton [appointed in 1862].”).  
Why was Merryman never tried? Was it because the government feared it could not get a unanimous 
Maryland jury to convict when as much as half of Maryland was sympathetic to the confederate 
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During the war, Merryman sued General Cadwalader for false imprisonment—his suit was 
unsuccessful. After the war, Merryman was elected to the legislature and also to state-wide 
office.
14
  
II. MYTH: THE EX PARTE MERRYMAN ORDER 
The first and primary Merryman myth is that President Lincoln ignored or defied a judicial 
order from Chief Justice Taney to release John Merryman.
15
 However, Taney never ordered 
anyone to release Merryman. As explained, Taney’s final order merely stated:  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
cause? See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 4, at 289 (“[Merryman’s] case never came to trial 
because the government knew that a Maryland jury would not convict him.”); see also BRUFF, supra 
note 6, at 134 (“Lincoln was unsure that he could rely on the loyalty of any Maryland authorities, 
including the judges and juries.”); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEXT: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS 134–35 (1987) (“[I]f [Maryland] offenders had been arrested by civil authorities, 
it was unlikely that any Maryland jury would have convicted them.”); ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN’S 
EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: THE END OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 51 (2004) (“[A]nyone could 
have predicted that [Maryland] proslavery judges would have released Merryman on sight.”). Was it 
because the government had a weak case, or, perhaps, because Merryman had a good defense? See 
RAGSDALE, supra note 2, at 27 (“In June 1861, the Maryland General Assembly passed an act 
affirming Merryman’s qualification as a second lieutenant in the Baltimore County Horse Guards 
[i.e., the militia], and declared his acts as an officer in the unit to be legal. Seven months later, the 
General Assembly repealed the earlier act.”); supra note 6 (collecting conflicting sources in regard to 
whether Governor Hicks approved Merryman’s conduct). Was it because the war was over, and it was 
time to let bygones be bygones? See MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 169 (“Neither Lee nor Jefferson 
Davis was ever tried . . . . What would have been the point of trying a relatively minor offender like 
John Merryman . . . for his offenses?”). Was it—like so much else—all Chief Justice Taney’s doing? 
Taney, as the senior Maryland circuit court judge, postponed hearing treason proceedings in 
November 1861, and in April 1862, complaining of illness, he again delayed proceedings until the 
following November. Taney told Judge Giles—the only other Maryland circuit court judge—not to 
hear such cases alone because treason was a capital offense. See, e.g., MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 157 
(“Taney stubbornly refused to permit the treason cases to go to trial.”); id. at 158 (quoting a letter 
from Taney, from 1864, the year Taney died, which stated that treason trials cannot move forward 
because Maryland was under martial law); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 38–39 (same); SIMON, supra 
note 5, at 197 (noting Taney’s “dilatory tactics”); see also, e.g., RAGSDALE, supra note 2, at 29 (“As 
circuit judge, Taney successfully resisted the prosecution of Merryman and other Marylanders 
indicted for treason.”). See generally infra note 52 (discussing Judge Giles).  
14
 See MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 169–70 (indicating that John Merryman’s lawsuit against 
Cadwalader was dropped in 1864, and discussing Merryman’s post-Civil War political career); see 
also Jonathan W. White ed., A Letter to Secretary of State William H. Seward Regarding Civil 
Liberties in Maryland, 107(2) MD. HIST. MAG. 171, 172 (Summer 2012).  
15
 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (2006) (Robertson, J.) (“Lincoln ignored 
Taney’s order . . . .”); Major Christopher M. Ford, From Nadir to Zenith: The Power to Detain in 
War, 207 MIL. L. REV. 203, 222 (2011) (“The Court ruled the suspension unconstitutional and 
ordered Merryman released.”); Jack Goldsmith, Reflections on Government Lawyering, 205 MIL. L. 
REV. 192, 198 (2010) (“Lincoln decided to ignore Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s order to release a 
prisoner because the President lacked authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.” (citing 
Merryman)); see also, e.g., Captain Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court’s Role in Defining the 
Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals: A Study, Critique, and Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2005) (“President Lincoln ignored Taney’s order and continued to confine 
Merryman, eventually indicting him for treason.”); Colonel Gary M. Bowman, Army Lawyers and the 
Military Law Review (forthcoming) 
http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/561/ 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629688 
01/11/2015 4:50  
DRAFT 
 
10 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interagency: An Examination of Army Lawyers’ Experience with Military Commissions and Habeas 
Corpus, in THE US ARMY AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 339, 343 
(Kendall D. Gott & Michael G. Brooks eds., 2008) (“[Taney] issued an order to release Merryman, 
which went unheeded by the Army”); cf., e.g., Colonel Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-
Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 108 & n.553 (1998) (“Confronting an unprecedented national crisis, Lincoln took a series 
of actions wholly without constitutional sanction—[including] blatantly disregarding court 
orders . . . .” (citing Merryman)).  
The same Merryman myth is repeatedly put forward in the leading student-edited law journals and in 
other fora by judges and leading academics. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT 
ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 200 n.38 (2012) (“Chief Justice 
Roger Taney . . . ordered the release of a detainee in Ex parte Merryman . . . . Lincoln ignored 
Taney’s order . . . .”); JOSEPH M. BESSETTE & JOHN J. PITNEY, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT & 
POLITICS: DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND CITIZENSHIP 163 (2014) (“When the authorities failed 
to produce the prisoner, Taney ordered him released. . . . Lincoln ignored Taney’s mandate . . . .”); 
DOUGLAS CLOUATRE, PRESIDENTS AND THEIR JUSTICES 60 (2010) (explaining that Taney’s “Ex 
Parte Merryman order to release . . . a civilian from military detention was ignored by Lincoln”); 
NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 110 (2004) (“Taney attempted to 
serve a paper at the prison to free Merryman . . . .”); BRIAN R. DIRCK, WAGING WAR ON TRIAL: A 
HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS, AND DOCUMENTS 88 (2003) (“Taney himself issued a writ of habeas 
corpus to secure Merryman’s release . . . .”); GEORGE C. EDWARDS III & STEPHEN J. WAYNE, 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING 415 (8th ed. 2010) (“Taney ordered 
[Merryman’s] release, but Lincoln refused to give him up to the U.S. marshal sent to bring him into 
court. . . . Lincoln simply ignored the decision . . . .” (emphasis added)); KERMIT L. HALL & JOHN J. 
PATRICK, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT SHAPED AMERICA 52 (2006) 
(“The [C]hief [J]ustice ordered John Merryman released from prison.”); RANETA LAWSON MACK & 
MICHAEL J. KELLY, EQUAL JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: AMERICA’S LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE 
EMERGING TERRORIST THREAT 238 (2000) (“Lincoln . . . suspend[ed] habeas corpus and 
disregard[ed] Chief Justice Taney’s order to release a prisoner held by executive fiat in Ex Parte 
Merryman . . . .”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 23 (1999) 
(“Taney then stated that Lincoln’s suspension was unconstitutional and directed Merryman’s 
release.”); 12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION, 1941–1953, at 285 
(2006) (“President Abraham Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s command that the army 
release John Merryman . . . .”); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 116 (2005) (“Chief Justice 
Taney . . . ordered a military commander to release [Merryman] . . . . Lincoln refused to accept this 
judicial command.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Symposium Introduction, Stare Decisis and Nonjudicial 
Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1147, 1156 (2008) (“Taney held Lincoln’s suspension of the writ 
unconstitutional and ordered Merryman freed. Lincoln did not comply.” (footnote omitted)); Joseph 
M. Bessette, Rethinking Jackson’s Concurrence in Youngstown v. Sawyer, in THE LIMITS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 194, 214 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010) (“Lincoln 
ignored Taney’s order to release Merryman . . . .”); Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, 
Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1430 n.44 (1999) (“Chief Justice 
Taney’s order that Merryman be released was ignored . . . .”); id. at 1430 (“Except for Lincoln in the 
very unusual climate of the Spring of 1861, no president has openly defied and refused to execute a 
judgment.”); Daniel C. Diller & Stephen H. Wirls, Commander in Chief, in 1 GUIDE TO THE 
PRESIDENCY 629, 668 (Michael Nelson ed., 2d ed. 2015) (“Taney . . . ordered the army to release 
Merryman, but Lincoln defiantly refused to permit his release.” (emphasis added)); Christopher L. 
Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 362 
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(1994) (“The one exception is Merryman, in which Lincoln apparently thought it necessary and 
constitutionally permissible to confine an agitator in violation of Chief Justice Taney’s judicial order. 
Rebellion was at hand, and a skilled provocateur might well have been a threat to national security. 
Under those circumstances Lincoln may have been right to defy Taney . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (“[Taney] ordered that the 
prisoner Merryman, whose detention Congress had not purported to authorize, must be released. . . . 
President Lincoln chose to defy the Chief Justice’s decision.” (footnote omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political 
Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 365 n.57 (2010) (“Lincoln famously defied Chief Justice Taney’s 
order to release a prisoner in Ex parte Merryman . . . .”); Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1378 (“Today 
we remember John Merryman because Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney’s writ of habeas corpus 
directing his release.”); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Emergency Powers, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY 333, 341 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds. 2006) (“[Lincoln] . . . 
def[ied] Chief Justice Taney’s order to release a prisoner . . . .”) (citing Merryman); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1227, 1277 (2008) (asserting that 
“Chief Justice Taney . . . had issued a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual held in military 
custody”) (citing Merryman); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power To Say What The Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 278 (1994) (explaining that Taney “ordered 
Merryman released”); id. at 279 (“Lincoln dissented. He did not release Merryman as Taney had 
ordered.”); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 17 (2014) 
(“Having unilaterally suspended habeas corpus, President Abraham Lincoln ignored Chief Justice 
Taney’s order granting habeas relief in Ex parte Merryman.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy 
Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1005, 1029 (2007) (“Lincoln disregarded Taney’s order to release Merryman . . . .”); 
Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and 
Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 53–54 (2014) (“A few months later, Chief Justice 
Taney issued a writ ordering the release of a Confederate supporter, John Merryman, and ruling that 
Lincoln had acted unconstitutionally by suspending the writ.” (footnote omitted)); Talbert, supra note 
6, at 177 (“Chief Justice Roger B. Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus for [Merryman’s] release, but 
it was ignored by the president.”); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE 
L.J. 600, 638 n.131 (2009) (“Chief Justice Taney ordered the release of John Merryman . . . .”); 
Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 355 n.121 (2006) 
(“Taney . . . ordered the release of the prisoner; Lincoln, however, did not comply with the order.”); 
Michael Vorenberg, The Chase Court (1864–1873): Cautious Reconstruction, in THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 103, 103 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005) (“Taney had 
issued an ex parte decision demanding Merryman’s release . . . .”); Associate Justice Richard E. 
Welch III, “They Will Not Open Their Ears”: Should we Listen to the Supreme Court and Should the 
Courts Listen to us?, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 99 n.35 (2012) (“[O]ne should also consider President 
Lincoln’s direct defiance of Chief Justice Taney’s judicial order to release John Merryman.” 
(emphasis added)); John Yoo, Lincoln at War, 38 VT. L. REV. 3, 37 (2013) (“Lincoln . . . ignored 
Taney’s order releasing Merryman.”); John Yoo, Merryman and Milligan (and McCardle), 34(3) J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 243, 243 (Nov. 2009) (“In these two cases [Merryman and Milligan], federal courts 
ordered the release of the petitioners on the ground that the military had exceeded its constitutional 
authority.”); id. at 244 (“Taney then issued an opinion ordering Merryman’s release.”); id. 
(characterizing the response to Taney as “includ[ing] outright presidential defiance”); id. at 257 (“In 
Merryman, Chief Justice Taney issued a writ to President Lincoln, who refused to follow it. It is 
probably the only unambiguous example of a President of the United States refusing to obey an order 
of the federal judiciary.”); Ian Zuckerman, One Law for War and Peace? Judicial Review and 
Emergency Powers between the Norm and the Exception, 13(4) CONSTELLATIONS 522, 532 n.48 
(Dec. 2006) (“Famously, Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney’s demand that Merryman be discharged 
in [E]x parte Merryman . . . .”); Thomas E. Baker, At War with the Constitution: A History Lesson 
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from the Chief Justice, 14 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 69, 70 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL 
THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)) (“Taney rebuked Lincoln by ruling that 
only Congress could suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and further directed that the President be 
delivered a copy of the order requiring the release of a civilian being held in military custody.” 
(emphasis added)); see also, e.g., BRUFF, supra note 6, at 135 (“Lincoln should either have let 
Merryman go or appealed the order to release him.” (emphasis added)); JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 56 (1980) (noting “Abraham Lincoln’s outright 
refusal to obey Chief Justice Taney’s order in Ex parte Merryman”); DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S 
CONSTITUTION 188 (2003) (“Critics point out that Merryman is the only known instance where the 
president has actually disobeyed a court order because he disagreed with it.” (emphasis added)); 
OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 96 n.36 (2006) (“[I]n defiance of a court order to the contrary, Merryman was not 
released.”); MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN, THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION 
249 (2015) (“Chief Justice Roger Taney ruled against President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of  
habeas corpus in the Civil War in 1861, but Lincoln disregarded that decree . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
id. (“Abraham Lincoln did not comply with Chief Justice Taney’s order in Merryman.”); SWISHER, 
supra note 6, at 112–13 (“Taney . . . reminded [Lincoln] that it now remained for the President to 
fulfil his oath of office by executing the judgment of the Court and releasing the prisoner. The 
President made no reply . . . .”); JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 150 & n.* (2012) (“Lincoln had evaded the chief justice’s order [in 
Merryman] . . . .”); Fritz Allhof, The War on Terror and the Ethics of Exceptionalism, 8(4) J. MIL. 
ETHICS 265, 274 n.27 (Nov. 2009) (“Lincoln went on to ignore Taney’s order to restore [the writ].”); 
Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public 
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1814 n.79 (2009) (“President Lincoln famously ignored Chief Justice 
Taney’s judicial order in Ex Parte Merryman . . . .”); Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress’s Power to 
Block Enforcement of Federal Court Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1361 (2008) (“The most 
notorious and, indeed, the sole example of a presidential nullification of a court judgment is President 
Lincoln’s defiance of the mandate in Ex parte Merryman.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as 
Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 46 (1993) (“Ex parte 
Merryman . . . is the only reported instance of which I am aware where a President asserted the power 
to disregard a judicial judgment on the ground that he disagreed with its legal basis.” (emphasis 
added)); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1296 
(2004) (asserting that “Lincoln defied Chief Justice Taney’s order invalidating Lincoln’s suspension 
of habeas corpus” without quoting any particular language in Taney’s order); Paulsen, Lincoln and 
Judicial Authority, supra at 1285 (expounding upon “Lincoln’s [d]efiance of Taney’s order in Ex 
parte Merryman”); Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5, at 89 (“In Ex parte Merryman, 
Lincoln . . . refus[ed] to honor a judicial decree as binding law on the executive, even in that specific 
case.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 995 
(2008) (“[C]onsider Lincoln’s decision to defy a habeas corpus order issued by Chief Justice Taney 
(in Ex parte Merryman) during the opening days of the war.”); Judge Richard A. Posner, Desperate 
Times, Desperate Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at § 7, p. 10 (reviewing DANIEL FARBER, 
LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003)) (asserting that Lincoln “flout[ed] Chief Justice Roger Taney’s 
order granting habeas corpus” and that “[o]fficials are obliged to obey judicial orders even when 
erroneous” (emphasis added)). Judge Posner’s position is puzzling. Generally, “officials”—like 
anybody else—are only obliged to obey a judicial order, if issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
if the “officials” are parties served with process, and if the “officials” have an opportunity to be heard. 
Cf., e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 273 (2003) (“The propensity 
to obey judges is unrelated to the textual basis of their decisions. It is a function simply of their 
jurisdiction, with Ex parte Merryman a rare exception.”). How can Posner conclude that Lincoln 
“flout[ed]” a judicial order without explaining what court issued the order, the basis of the court’s 
jurisdiction, how and when Lincoln was made a party, and when Lincoln (as opposed to General 
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13 
I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, with my opinion, to be 
filed and recorded in the [C]ircuit [C]ourt of the United States for the [D]istrict of 
Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a copy, under seal, to the president of 
the United States. It will then remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his 
constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to 
determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United 
States to be respected and enforced.
16
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Cadwalader, the named defendant) had an opportunity to be heard? But cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT 
A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 85–86 (2006) 
(“[Lincoln] was as right to disobey the law in [Merryman] as Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. were 
right to do so in their situations.” (emphasis added)).  
16
 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153 (quoting United States Constitution Article II, Section 3 
(Take Care Clause)) (emphasis added); MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 91–92 (“This [situation] was . . . at 
least remarkable. There was no order commanding anybody in the chain of command—Cadwalader, 
[Major General] Keim [who authorized the arresting military officers to seize Merryman], General in 
Chief Scott, or even Abraham Lincoln himself—to set John Merryman ‘at liberty.’ There was no court 
order requiring that he be released from Fort McHenry or restored to freedom. He had not, by court 
order, been ‘discharged’ from the army’s custody.” (emphasis added)); id. at 150 (same); RAGSDALE, 
supra note 2, at 4 & 12 (same); JACK STARK, PROHIBITED GOVERNMENT ACTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 48 (2002) (“The disposition is not congruent with the 
opinion. . . . Instead [Taney] made a mere gesture . . . .”); see also, e.g., Ex parte McQuillon, 16 F. 
Cas. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 8294) (Betts, J.) (“[Judge Betts] would, however, follow out that 
case [Merryman], but would express no opinion whatever, as it would be indecorous on his part to 
oppose the [C]hief [J]ustice. He would therefore decline taking any action on the writ at all.” 
(emphasis added)); In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359, 1863 WL 1066, at *8 (1863) (Dixon, C.J.) (“It follows 
that in my judgment the return of General E[lliot] shows no sufficient cause for the detention of the 
petitioner, or why he should refuse to produce his body before this court; but as the issuing of the 
attachment at the present time may lead to serious and most unfortunate collisions, which it is possible 
to avoid by a short delay, I deem it advisable, adhering to the precedent set by other courts and judges 
under like circumstances, and out of respect to the national authorities, to withhold it until they shall 
have had time to consider what steps they should properly take in the case.”). But cf. Ringel, supra 
note 6, at 210 (“[Taney] ordered Merryman transferred to a civilian court . . . .”).  
As explained above, it was Major General Keim who authorized Merryman’s arrest. The arrest was 
carried out by Colonel Yohe and Yohe’s subordinates. After doing so, Yohe ordered Adjutant 
Wittimore and Lieutenant Abel to transfer Merryman to Fort McHenry, at which juncture Merryman 
fell under General Cadwalader’s authority. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144. But see ALLEN 
C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT 281 (1999) (“Merryman was arrested on 
May 25th by General George Cadwalader . . . .”); JULIE NOVKOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PRESIDENCY: STRUGGLES FOR SUPREMACY 222 (2013) (“Cadwallader . . . entered the home of Lt. 
John Merryman of Maryland’s militia and arrested him . . . .”); J.G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, 
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 301 (2d ed. rev. 1969) (“Merryman . . . was arrested in 
Maryland . . . by order of General Cadwalader . . . .”); Thomas F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of 
the Press during the Civil War, 9 VA. L. REV. 516, 530 (1923) (“[Merryman] was taken to Fort 
McHenry by General Cadwallader acting under authority of General Keim.”); James Riddlesperger, 
Suspension of Habeas Corpus, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 923, 923 (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 2006) (asserting that “Cadwalader ordered the arrest of . . . John Merryman”); but cf. 
REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 26 (describing Colonel Yohe as a “[c]aptain”); Affairs in Baltimore, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1861 (referring to a “Captain Yoe [sic?]” as the senior officer who carried out 
Merryman’s seizure), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1861/05/29/news/affairs-balimore-
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14 
Again, Taney issued no order to release Merryman. It follows Lincoln could not have ignored 
or defied it, and neither could anyone else for that matter.  
 
Moreover, even if we assume, counterfactually, that Taney had issued an order releasing 
Merryman, any such order would have been directed against the named defendant—
Merryman’s jailer—General George Cadwalader.
17
 Not against Lincoln. Lincoln was not a 
party in Ex parte Merryman. Lincoln was not served with process in Ex parte Merryman. 
Because Taney conducted all courtroom proceedings at a lightning pace,
18
 over a mere two 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
habeas-corpus-cask-return-sheriff-action-chief-justice-taney.html. Interestingly, Merryman’s petition 
indicated that these events happened on or about May 25, 1861, but Cadwalader’s response indicated 
that these events happened on or about May 20, 1861. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144 
(“The prisoner was brought to this post on the 20th inst. . . .”). Such errors during the fog of war (or, 
even, during everyday litigation) are hardly surprising. For example, Taney ordered the clerk of the 
Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, Thomas Spicer, to issue the original writ. See id. As 
ordered, Spicer issued and signed the writ. See id.; Summons issued to General George Cadwalader 
to appear before Court on Monday, 27 May 1861, with the body of John Merryman, ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND (BIOGRAPHICAL SERIES): JOHN MERRYMAN (1824–1881) (last visited Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/pdf/summons.pdf. 
Cadwalader believed—in error—that the writ was issued by the clerk of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144.  
17
 See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 23 (“The writ [of habeas corpus] was directed to the official who 
had custody of the prisoner . . . .”); id. at 33 (“The writ was addressed to General George Cadwalader, 
commander of the military district in which Fort McHenry lay . . . .”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field 
Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension Power, and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 400 
(2007) (same). Apparently, at the time of the Merryman litigation, the commander of Fort McHenry 
was Major W.W. Morris. See infra note 52.  
18
 See CHANGES IN LAW AND SOCIETY DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 59 (Christian 
G. Samito ed., 2009) (noting the Taney “swiftly ruled” in Merryman); RICHARD J. ELLIS, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 413 (2012) (noting that Taney “rushed to Baltimore 
to preside at the hearing,” and further characterizing the Merryman proceedings as a “rush to 
judgment”); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 40–41 (criticizing Taney’s conduct of the proceedings, and 
characterizing them as “precipitate” and “hasty”); see also BRUFF, supra note 6, at 135 (explaining 
that Taney issued his opinion “[w]ithout inviting the executive’s lawyers to argue their side of the 
case”); ELLIS, supra at 413 (asserting that Taney reached his decision “without giving the 
administration an opportunity to justify its suspension”); MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 177 (“[Taney] 
did not give the United States district attorney an opportunity to express the government’s position on 
the critical question before the court . . . .”); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 40 (noting that Taney 
decided Merryman “without benefit of hearing argument from counsel”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST 
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 172 (2006) (asserting that, in Merryman, 
Taney “[r]efus[ed] to allow the government to be heard”); JENNIFER L. WEBER, COPPERHEADS: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF LINCOLN’S OPPONENTS IN THE NORTH 223 n.35 (2006) (“Taney . . . made the 
ruling alone . . . and without ever hearing arguments on behalf of the government.”). Again, to clarify 
the chronology, Taney received a habeas petition on May 25, 1861, a Saturday; he issued an ex parte 
order on or about Sunday; i.e., he ordered Cadwalader to appear (and also to produce Merryman) the 
next day, on Monday at 11:00 am, and he concluded all live judicial proceedings the following day, 
on Tuesday. All these courtroom-related events took place during an ongoing civil war, in 
circumstances where the government had asked for an adjournment. See supra notes 7–13, and 
accompanying text. Put simply, Taney was not only speeding the Merryman litigation along at a 
lightning pace, but he was working Saturdays and Sundays, whole weekends, to do so! See 
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15 
days, i.e., during May 27 and May 28, 1861, during the fog of (civil) war, it remains unclear 
if Lincoln even knew of the existence of the judicial proceedings while they were ongoing.
19
 
In other words, Lincoln never had any meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because Lincoln 
was not a party, because he was not served with process, and because he had no meaningful 
opportunity to be heard, Lincoln would not have been bound by any judicial order to release 
Merryman (even if Taney had issued such an order). That is black letter law.
20
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 40 (“The writ was issued by Taney on [Sunday]—surely not a normal 
business day for the judiciary—and was made returnable the next morning . . . .”); id. at 26 (same); cf. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (granting a private party defendant 21 days to answer a complaint); id. 
12(a)(2) (granting a United States officer, sued in an official capacity, 60 days to answer a complaint); 
id. 12(a)(3) (granting a United States officer, sued in an individual capacity, 60 days to answer a 
complaint). In effect, Taney did not give Cadwalader, a New Jersey native, even one full business day 
either: (i) to consult (much less coordinate) with the United States Attorney for Maryland, with the 
Attorney General in Washington, and with the Army’s law officers; or (ii) to find a private attorney in 
the Maryland bar to represent his personal interests in high-stakes litigation. See 26 May 1861, Return 
of U.S. Marshall [sic] Washington Bonifant, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND (BIOGRAPHICAL SERIES): 
JOHN MERRYMAN (1824–1881) (last visited Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/pdf/return28may61.pd
f (stating that the marshal made service on Cadwalader at “five o’clock PM” on May 26, 1861); Letter 
from E.D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, to General 
Cadwalader (May 27, 1861) (acknowledging “receipt, by the hands of a special messenger, of your 
report of this date, with four enclosures, in relation to the arrest of John Merryman” (emphasis 
added)) (available in the Cadwalader Family collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania); see 
also infra note 19 (discussing Lincoln’s apparent first recorded contact with the Merryman litigation). 
According to Dean Simon, Cadwalader’s request for a postponement was a “signal that General 
Cadwalader expected to take his orders from Lincoln, not the Chief Justice.” SIMON, supra note 5, at 
188. Cadwalader’s position left him little time to think about “signals.” The Chief Justice ordered 
Cadwalader to, among other things, put forward a defense, in regard to a difficult set of legal issues, 
in less than one day—in fact, he had only seventeen hours. In such circumstances, it is hardly 
surprising that the military officer—who was also busy fighting a civil war—would seek further 
guidance from his superiors and also to shift, quite rightly in my view, an explosive political question 
onto the country’s elected leadership.  
19
 I see no record indicating that Linclon had knowledge of Ex parte Merryman pior to May 30, 1861. 
See 3 LINCOLN DAY BY DAY: A CHRONOLOGY, 1861–1865, at 45 (Earl Schenck Miers & C. Percy 
Powell eds., 1960) (“May 30 [1861]. . . . Maryland district attorney consults with President 
concerning John Merryman in prison at Fort McHenry, Md., without benefit of writ of habeas 
corpus.”).  
20
 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (Jackson, J.) (“An 
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded 
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”); Hansberry v. 
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (Stone, J.) (“It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not 
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”); see also, e.g., 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877) (Field, J.) (“[I]t was a familiar rule that countries foreign to 
our own disregarded a judgment merely against the person, where the defendant had not been served 
with process nor had a day in court . . . .”); cf., e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 
(1850) (Catron, J.) (“On the other hand, the international law as it existed among the States in 1790 
was, that a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind the person of a citizen of another, was 
void within the foreign State, when the defendant had not been served with process or voluntarily 
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III. MYTH: THE EX PARTE MERRYMAN OPINION 
The second Merryman myth is that Lincoln ignored Taney’s opinion:
21
 that is, Lincoln’s 
post-Merryman conduct and his interactions with Executive Branch subordinates failed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
made defence, because neither the legislative jurisdiction, nor that of courts of justice, had binding 
force.”). But see Michael Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
691, 720 (2004) (suggesting that, in Merryman, the “executive and military were in effect parties to 
the case” (emphasis added)); Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5, at 89 (“In Ex parte 
Merryman, Lincoln . . . refus[ed] to honor a judicial decree as binding law on the executive, even in 
that specific case.”); but cf. Michael Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 
219 n.9 (2002) (“[C]ompare Chief Justice Taney’s writ of habeas corpus directed at President 
Lincoln, at the outset of the Civil War, in Ex parte Merryman . . . . Lincoln ignored the writ.”). 
Professor Paulsen’s position is troubling. At the close of the Merryman litigation, Taney had the clerk 
of the Circuit Court transmit a copy of the proceedings and his opinion to Lincoln. Surely, such an 
after the fact communication cannot be enough to bind anyone—including the President—either 
legally or in any normative sense connected to now defunct, then established, or now prevailing 
conceptions of fair play or civil procedure. Cf. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945) (Stone, C.J.) (explaining that the scope of personal jurisdiction rests on considerations relating 
to “traditional [plural] notions of fair play and substantial justice” (emphasis added)); id. at 320 
(reformulating test for personal jurisdiction as relating to “our traditional [singular] conception of fair 
play and substantial justice”).  
Now some otherwise well informed commentators believe that Cadwalader defied the courts, and that 
he did so as a result of instructions which he had already received through the military chain of 
command, but having their ultimate source from Lincoln. If these views were grounded in 
unambiguous, or even reasonably clear, historical fact, it would be fair to ascribe Cadwalader’s 
“defiance” to Lincoln (even if, as a formal legal matter, Lincoln was not an actual party to 
Merryman). But these views are not well grounded in historical fact. As explained below, there is 
little in the historical record to establish that Cadwalader ignored or defied the courts. But even if we 
adopt the position that Cadwalader’s actions could be fairly characterized as “defying” the courts, 
there is no good reason—supported by the reported historical record—to tie Cadwalader’s conduct to 
any purported authorization originating with Lincoln. See infra notes 37, 64–80, and accompanying 
text.  
21
 See, e.g., Major Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. 
REV. 67, 99 n.160 (2000) (“President Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney’s opinion and Merryman 
remained imprisoned.”); Wayne McCormack, Emergency Powers and Terrorism, 185 MIL. L. REV. 
69, 94 n.116 (2005) (“President Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, and Merryman 
remained imprisoned.”); see also, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 122 (2005) (“Lincoln proceeded to disregard Taney’s solo ruling, thereby challenging 
Taney’s very jurisdiction over the matter.”); RICHARD H. FALLON JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 26 (2d ed. 2013) (“Lincoln 
actually defied a ruling by the Chief Justice Roger Taney denying the authority of military officials to 
hold suspected Confederate sympathizers without bringing them into court and proving them guilty of 
crimes.”); id. at 318 (“[Lincoln] ordered his military officers to ignore Taney’s ruling, and the officers 
obeyed the President, not the Chief Justice.”); ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
327 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1899) (“The President simply ignored Taney’s decision . . . .”); 
REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 40 (noting the “administration’s disregard of the decision”); SCOTT M. 
MATHESON, JR., PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PERILOUS TIMES 41 (2009) (“[Lincoln] 
ignor[ed] Taney’s opinion . . . .”); DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE WAITE COURT: JUSTICES, 
RULINGS, AND LEGACY 277 (2003) (“[Lincoln] supported his commanders in defying Chief Justice 
Taney’s [Merryman] ruling . . . .”); id. at 5 (same); Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1359 (“Lincoln neither 
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properly reflect the law as established by Taney. Simply put, the legal and normative 
assumptions behind this critique of Lincoln’s conduct do not cohere with the basic structure 
of the American legal system.  
 
In the United States—indeed, across the common law world—the courts establish and clarify 
law through judicial orders. Orders usually appear with opinions, but the latter are not 
necessary to resolve a case or controversy. Indeed, a court, even an appellate court, may issue 
an order absent any opinion.
22
 The issuance of opinions by courts is a convention or tradition 
of the American judicial system, but such opinions are not mandated by the express text of 
Article III,
23
 by any federal statute, or even by any federal judicial decision.
24
 In short, in the 
American judicial system, orders are primary, not opinions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
obeyed [Taney’s] opinion nor directly responded to it; he simply ignored it.”); Adam Klein & 
Benjamin Wittes, Preventative Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
85, 118 (2011) (“Taney eventually declared Merryman’s detention unlawful and transmitted his 
opinion to Lincoln, who more or less ignored it . . . .”); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause Cases 
and Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1243, 1258 n.88 (2012) (“Abraham Lincoln did ignore 
Chief Justice Taney’s circuit opinion holding that the President could not unilaterally suspend habeas 
corpus . . . .”); Seidman, supra note 15, at 53–54 (“Lincoln simply ignored the opinion.”); Norman W. 
Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 
1976 (2008) (“Lincoln and Bates’ suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and defiance of Taney’s 
opinion in Ex parte Merryman were followed by congressional suspension in 1863.”); Yoo, 
Merryman and Milligan (and McCardle), supra note 15, at 244 (“Taney then issued an opinion 
ordering Merryman’s release.”); id. (characterizing the response to Taney as “includ[ing] outright 
presidential defiance”); Ashley C. Nikkel, Note, Painting Ourselves Into a Corner: The Fundamental 
Paradoxes of Modern Warfare in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 12 NEV. L.J. 443, 447 (2012) (“Lincoln, of 
course, ignored Taney.”); cf., e.g., Captain John C. Cruden, The War-Making Process, 69 MIL. L. 
REV. 35, 48 & n.56 (1975) (“Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus was invalidated . . . .” (citing 
Merryman)).  
22
 See, e.g., Judge Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
219, 222 (1999) (“The federal system has adopted a number of strategies to deal with this [high] 
volume [of federal cases], including more staff, with centrally located staff attorneys; a smaller 
proportion of cases argued orally; less time allotted to those cases that are argued; decisions by one-
line order or brief memorandum; and, of course, unpublished opinions.” (emphasis added)). But cf. id. 
at 226 (“When a governmental official, judge or not, acts contrary to what was done on a previous 
day, without giving reasons, and perhaps for no reason other than a change of mind, can the power 
that is being exercised properly be called ‘judicial’ [and consistent with Article III]?”).  
23
 See U.S. CONST. art. III.  
24
 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
123, 126 (2000) (“The operative legal act performed by a court is the entry of a judgment; an opinion 
is simply an explanation of reasons for that judgment.”); Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1143, 1161 (2006) (“An opinion cannot be central to dispute resolution because there is no 
requirement that an appellate court issue an opinion, and frequently such courts decide cases without 
any opinion.” (emphasis added)); see also Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1327 (1996) (“The President’s 
ordinary obligation to enforce a judgment extends only to the raw judgment itself: the finding of 
liability or nonliability and the specification of the remedy. That duty does not impose on the 
President any requirement in future cases to follow the reasoning that led to the court’s judgment or to 
extend the principles of that judgment beyond the issues and parties encompassed by it.”); id. at 1328 
(“[T]he issuance of opinions is not an essential aspect of the judicial power.”). See generally Merrill, 
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In the first paragraph of Cooper v. Aaron, a unanimous Supreme Court stated: “[This case] 
necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty 
on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation 
of the United States Constitution.”
25
 In short, even Cooper v. Aaron, which is the most 
forceful and ambitious statement of the scope of federal judicial authority, framed the issue in 
terms of state officials’ wrongful interference or other noncompliance with extant federal 
judicial orders, not in terms of noncompliance with mere opinions. Applying the legal 
standard laid out in Cooper to Lincoln during Ex parte Merryman would be quite 
anachronistic. But, even if the legal standard laid out in Cooper ought to apply to Lincoln’s 
conduct, Cooper does not mandate that officials (such as the President) must comply with 
mere opinions. In short, faulting Lincoln for noncompliance with Taney’s Merryman opinion 
makes little sense as a formal legal matter.  
 
Still, even if obedience to mere opinions is not a strict legal obligation, one might reason that 
Executive Branch obedience to judicial opinions reflects a valuable rule of law aspirational 
goal. But even if in general such an abstract aspirational goal were conceded, such aspirations 
ought not to apply to Merryman. Why? First, we do not know what court issued Merryman
26
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
supra note 15 passim. But compare Lawson & Moore, supra at 1328 n.284 (suggesting that legal 
“requirements that judges give reasons for their conclusions . . . are therefore constitutionally 
questionable”), with Sullivan, supra at 1161 n.90 (explaining that under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a), federal district courts must “explain their decisions when they sit as the trier of fact,” 
such as when a district court hears a case absent a jury).  
25
 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (authored unanimously) (emphasis added). This language is not unique to the 
opinion’s first paragraph. Later, the Court stated:  
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution 
without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a 
unanimous Court in saying that: “If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, 
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired 
under those judgments, the [C]onstitution itself becomes a solemn mockery . . . .” United 
States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136. A Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal 
court order is similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 
1932, also for a unanimous Court, “it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not 
the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the 
restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but 
impotent phrases . . . .” Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397–398.  
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18–19 (emphasis added). The Court insulated “judgments” and “orders,” not 
opinions, against state interposition, nullification, mob violence, and other lawlessness. For those 
seeking to engage in comparative legal analysis with other common law jurisdictions, beware: 
“judgement,” as used today in the Common Travel Area, is synonymous with an American judicial 
opinion, not an order. See BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 490 (Jeff 
Newman & Tiger Jackson eds., 3d ed. 1980) (defining “judgment” and noting the distinction between 
American English and British English in the legal context).  
26
 See supra note 1 (illustrating conflicting reports of the case—both as a circuit court opinion and 
also as an in chambers opinion of the Chief Justice of the United States). Compare MCGINTY, supra 
note 5, at 174 (arguing that Merryman was a chambers opinion, not a circuit court decision), with 
REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 44 (noting that, in Merryman, Taney “was speaking only as a member of 
a circuit court”), and Jonathan W. White, The Strangely Insignificant Role of the U.S. Supreme Court 
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or whether it had valid jurisdiction.
27
 Those that have studied the case have been and remain 
unsure and divided whether it was issued by the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland or 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
in the Civil War, 3(2) J. CIVIL WAR ERA 211, 218 (June 2013) (“Taney was sitting as a circuit justice 
in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, but he made his opinion appear to be that of a 
Supreme Court justice ‘at chambers.’”). A few commentators have even suggested that Taney issued 
Merryman in his capacity as a purported district court judge. See, e.g., BRIAN R. DIRCK, THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 99 (2007) 
(asserting that Taney issued Merryman “in his capacity as a federal district court judge”); GEORGE 
KATEB, LINCOLN’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 148 (2015) (“Ex parte Merryman . . . [was issued] pursuant 
to Taney’s role as a district court judge . . . .”); Steven G. Calabresi & Justin Braga, Judge Robert H. 
Bork and Professor Bruce Ackerman: An Essay on The Tempting of America, 13 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
47, 52 (2015) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW (1990) and Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.J. 1419 
(1990) (book review)) (“President Lincoln refused to enforce [the] Chief Justice’s district court 
ruling . . . .”). Likewise, several commentators have suggested that Merryman was issued by the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., DIRCK, supra note 15, at 88 (asserting that Ex parte Merryman was “issued 
by the Supreme Court”); HEAD & WOLCOTT, supra note 13, at 88 (“When a complaint was filed 
before the Supreme Court on [Merryman’s] behalf, they ruled in Ex Parte Merryman . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA 128 
(2005) (“In Ex parte Merryman, Taney, writing for the Court . . . .”); ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS 162 (2004) (asserting that Merryman was a “Supreme Court” ruling); 
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 272 (asserting that Merryman is 
“one of the few cases in which a Supreme Court decision . . . has been openly defied by one of the 
other branches”); SAMUEL WALKER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA 155 (2004) (explaining that the 
“Supreme Court overrule[d] President Lincoln in Ex Parte Merryman”); Samuel P. Newton, 1851–
1900: Introduction, in 5 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 
4, at 2097, 2098 (characterizing Merryman as a Supreme Court ruling); Dawinder S. Sidhu, 
Baltimore, Maryland, in 1 id. at 105, 106 (same); see also, e.g., PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 15, 
at 177 (“Lincoln understood the Constitution not necessarily to mean whatever the Supreme Court 
said it meant concerning slavery and national authority (Dred Scott) or concerning presidential power 
in wartime (Ex parte Merryman).”); cf., e.g., Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Where Moussaoui Meets Hamdi, 
183 MIL. L. REV. 151, 156 (2005) (asserting, absent evidence, that “Lincoln appealed [Merryman] to 
the full Supreme Court”). See generally JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND TREASON IN 
THE CIVIL WAR: THE TRIALS OF JOHN MERRYMAN (2011) (reporting on Merryman in all its 
complexity).  
27
 For discussion of the conflicting views relating to what court (if any) decided Merryman and also 
competing views as to the validity of the court’s jurisdiction (if any), see the thorough publications by 
MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 174–76 (noting that Taney’s jurisdiction is disputed), Edward A. Hartnett, 
The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251, 289 (2005) (concluding that “there 
remains no constitutional impediment to an individual Justice exercising original jurisdiction and 
issuing writs of habeas corpus as they have been empowered to do since 1789”), and Mark E. Neely, 
Jr., The Constitution and Civil Liberties Under Lincoln, in OUR LINCOLN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
LINCOLN AND HIS WORLD 37, 39–41 (Eric Foner ed., 2008) (arguing that Taney lacked jurisdiction in 
Merryman because Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 worked an unconstitutional expansion of 
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, even if that authority were exercised by a single justice 
in chambers). See generally FARBER, supra note 15, at 190–92 (discussing whether Taney had 
jurisdiction in Merryman); William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008) 
(collecting conflicting authorities); Vladeck, supra note 17 (same). Ragsdale argues that “Taney 
realized that his jurisdictional authority in Ex parte Merryman was irrelevant, since he was exercising 
no judicial power apart from the orders to file the records of the proceedings and to send a copy to 
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was a decision by Chief Justice Taney in chambers, and concomitantly what was the source 
of Taney’s jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute. Second, although the matter was and is 
unsettled, one view is that in chambers opinions, although (apparently) establishing the law 
of the case, do not carry controlling precedential weight in regard to other cases,
28
 even those 
with closely similar facts. Finally, although Taney concluded that Merryman was entitled to 
be released, Taney did not order his release. Taney’s opinion put forward only advice (or, 
perhaps, a legal position akin to an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum), not a traditional 
judicial order. In other words, Merryman was effectively an advisory opinion, and given the 
disparity between Taney’s order (which left Merryman in jail) and his opinion (which 
asserted that Merryman was entitled to be freed), it was perhaps a good deal less.  
 
In these circumstances, where Lincoln did not know what court (if any) issued the opinion, its 
basis for jurisdiction (if any), and the opinion’s precedential weight, Lincoln should not have 
conformed Executive Branch conduct to Taney’s opinion for all the reasons just stated, and 
also because judicially-issued advisory opinions are inconsistent with Article III and 
separation of powers norms. Executive Branch compliance with an advisory opinion (unless 
the President independently agrees with the opinion’s rationale) does not reflect comity or 
aspirational rule of law values, but instead, such compliance would reward judicial 
aggrandizement.  
 
In short, Lincoln had every reason to believe that there was no obligation to obey Taney’s 
opinion.  
IV. MYTH: APPEALING EX PARTE MERRYMAN 
The third Merryman myth is that Lincoln could have and should have upheld rule of law 
values by seeking clarity from the courts by appealing Taney’s Merryman decision to the 
(full) United States Supreme Court.
29
 But this was not feasible.
30
 In the context of a habeas 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
President Lincoln.” RAGSDALE, supra note 2, at 11. Evidently, Ragsdale discounts the initial ex parte 
order and subsequent attachment order, both directed to Cadwalader, as exercises of judicial power.  
28
 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1010 
n.167 (2005) (“Actions by single Justices are generally not considered to have precedential 
value . . . .”); Chief Justice Frank J. Williams & Nicole J. Benjamin, Military Trials of Terrorists: 
From the Lincoln Conspirators to the Guantanamo Inmates, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 609, 615 (2012) 
(“Unfortunately for Chief Justice Taney, his words carried no precedential value as an in-chambers 
opinion.”). But cf. The Impeachment Trial of President Abraham Lincoln, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 351, 367 
(1998) (reporting Mark E. Neely, Jr. stating, in mock cross-examination, that “we can consider 
[Merryman] a precedent from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court”).  
29
 See, e.g., JUSTICE STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE 
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES ch. 1 (2015) (“[Lincoln] did not release John Merryman. Neither did he 
appeal the ruling, as he might have done.” (emphasis added)); BRUFF, supra note 6, at 135 (“Lincoln 
should either have let Merryman go or appealed the order to release him.”); Fallon, Executive Power, 
supra note 15, at 22 (“[T]ake the best-known example . . . Lincoln defied the court in Merryman 
without bothering to appeal . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, supra 
note 15, at 1285 (“But defiance it was: [Lincoln] did not obey Taney’s order, nor did his 
administration seek any sort of appeal to the full Supreme Court.”); Paulsen, The Merryman Power, 
supra note 5, at 92 (posing the question whether Lincoln was “required [in Merryman] either to 
comply or to seek review and reversal by the full Supreme Court”); see also, e.g., TODD BREWSTER, 
LINCOLN’S GAMBLE: THE TUMULTUOUS SIX MONTHS THAT GAVE AMERICA THE EMANCIPATION 
Military Law Review (forthcoming) 
http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/561/ 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629688 
01/11/2015 4:50  
DRAFT 
 
21 
action, if the decision had been in chambers, the prevailing view is that there was no route to 
appeal to the full Court.
31
 But even if the court which heard Merryman was the Circuit Court 
for the District of Maryland or even if an appeal could be taken to the full Court from an 
otherwise jurisdictionally sound in chambers habeas decision, Cadwalader, the government, 
and Lincoln could have taken no such appeal in Merryman. Why? Merryman had brought a 
habeas corpus proceeding seeking a judicial order compelling Cadwalader to release him. 
Taney never issued any such order against Cadwalader (or against anyone else). As such, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
PROCLAMATION AND CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR 156 (2015) (“[Lincoln’s] 
administration did not appeal the decision on Merryman’s habeas petition . . . .”); THOMAS J. 
DILORENZO, LINCOLN UNMASKED: WHAT YOU’RE NOT SUPPOSED TO KNOW ABOUT DISHONEST 
ABE 93 (2006) (“The Lincoln administration could have appealed the chief justice’s ruling, but it 
chose to simply ignore it . . . .”); THOMAS J. DILORENZO, THE REAL LINCOLN: A NEW LOOK AT 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, HIS AGENDA, AND AN UNNECESSARY WAR 137 (2002) (same). But see 
Dunham, supra note 26, at 156 (asserting, absent evidence, that “Lincoln appealed [Merryman] to the 
full Supreme Court”).  
Likewise, among modern commentators, there is little substantive agreement in regard to which party 
would have prevailed had a Merryman appeal (or the same issues in another case) been heard by the 
full Supreme Court under Taney in early 1861. Compare, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 13, at 124 
(“There had been six justices forming the majority that declared the Missouri Compromise 
unconstitutional in the Dred Scott case. Only four of them continued to serve on the Court during the 
Civil War, and three of those four (including two Southerners) soon proved themselves to be strong 
Unionists. Taney alone remained unrepentant and unredeemed, as it were, and Taney alone was 
responsible for Ex parte Merryman . . . .”), THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CIVIL WAR DESK 
REFERENCE, supra note 8, at 208 (“Taney issues this writ . . . but the full U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to support him.”), and Mark E. Neely Jr., “Seeking a Cause of Difficulty with the Government”: 
Reconsidering Freedom of Speech and Judicial Conflict under Lincoln, in LINCOLN’S LEGACY: 
ETHICS AND POLITICS 48, 52 (Phillip Shaw Paludan ed., 2008) (“Taney did not have the whole court 
behind him or any way of getting it behind his [Merryman] decision any time soon.”), with Paulsen, 
The Merryman Power, supra note 5, at 92 n.38 (“[O]ne would not be optimistic about Lincoln’s 
chances of prevailing [in a Merryman appeal] with the 1861 Taney Court.”), ROSS, supra note 4, at 66 
(at the time Merryman was decided, “the Court’s majority [was] still . . . made up of men 
unsympathetic to Lincoln and his party”), and SIMON, supra note 5, at 239–40 (noting that Attorney 
General Bates opposed appealing an 1862 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, raising Merryman-related 
issues, to the United States Supreme Court), with HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND 
SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II, at 
93 (5th rev. ed. 2000) (“[Lincoln] visualised the Court as a partner in the nation’s preservation—not 
an easily realized vision, for the Court was at best a toss-up in terms of its stance on Lincoln’s 
policies.”).  
30
 See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 44 (noting “significant procedural obstacles to such an appeal as 
the law then stood”). It goes without saying that Cadwalader, Lincoln and his administration had no 
moral, practical, or legal duty to appeal Merryman absent the power to take such an appeal. See C.H. 
MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD 282 (1939) (“[T]here can be no 
responsibility without power . . . .”); J. ENOCH POWELL, M.P. AND SHADOW SECRETARY OF STATE 
FOR DEFENCE, Speech at Wolverhampton (Dec. 12, 1966), in FREEDOM AND REALITY 197, 199, 260 
(John Wood ed., 1969) (“‘[R]esponsibility’ depends upon the prior question of power . . . .”).  
31
 See MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 176 (suggesting that no appeal was possible); see also In re 
Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 191 (1847) (McLean, J.) (“This Court can exercise no power in an 
appellate form over decisions made at his chambers by a Justice of this Court or a judge of the district 
court.” (emphasis added)).  
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Merryman was the nonprevailing party, and only he was entitled to take an appeal (assuming 
any such appeal were possible).
32
 Cadwalader—as odd as it sounds—was the prevailing party 
in Merryman, and in the American system of justice, absent special circumstances, only a 
nonprevailing party, i.e., only a party aggrieved by a judicial order (not by an opinion), may 
take an appeal.
33
  
V. MYTH: GENERAL CADWALADER’S CONDUCT 
The fourth Merryman myth is an entire constellation of factual and legal claims relating to 
General Cadwalader’s conduct. The claims here include:  
A. Cadwalader (as opposed to Lincoln) ignored or defied Chief Justice Taney by not 
showing up for the first day’s hearing on May 27, 1861;
34
  
B. Cadwalader defied Taney by not producing Merryman after Taney granted a writ of 
habeas corpus directed to Cadwalader to produce (but not release) Merryman;
35
  
                                                             
32
 See Paul Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of Crisis: Our Civil War Experience—A History 
Lesson for a Post 9-11 America, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 25, 39 (2003) (noting that 
“Merryman did not appeal his incarceration to the full Supreme Court”).  
33
 See, e.g., Erastus Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 451, 465 (1853) (Grier, 
J.) (expounding on the “aggrieved” party rule); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 958, 
961 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) (“A litigant dissatisfied with the analysis of an opinion, but not 
aggrieved by the judgment, may not appeal. . . . Indeed, a debate about language of an opinion is not 
even a case or controversy within the scope of Article III.”); see also, e.g., Livornese v. Med. 
Protective Co., 136 Fed. Appx. 473, 481 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (Roth, J.) (“As the District Court imposed 
no actual liability against [the cross-appellant] by the March 7, 2003 . . . order, or by any other order, 
there is nothing for us to reverse. We construe [the cross-appellant’s] request as an invitation to 
reverse the legal memorandum or reasoning of the District Court. We review only judgments, not 
opinions.”); 13 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE Necessity that judgment be adverse § 58.08 
(3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he law does not give a party who is not aggrieved an appeal from a judgment in his 
or her favor . . . .”); cf., e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84–85 (requiring that in 
seeking review in the Supreme Court of the United States from federal circuit court decisions “writs 
of error shall not be brought but within five years after rendering or passing the judgment or decree 
complained of” (emphasis added)). Interestingly, Erastus Corning, a party to the 1853 Supreme Court 
case discussed above, was the recipient of a famous Civil War era letter discussing habeas corpus 
from President Lincoln. See Letter from President Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others (June 12, 
1863), in 8 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1862–1863, at 298, 298–314 (John G. Nicolay 
& John Hay eds., N.Y., The Tandy-Thomas Co. new ed. 1894).  
34
 See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 3, at 223 (stating that Cadwalader “refused either to attend the 
May 27 hearing . . . and refused to comply with a second order [to attend a contempt hearing] to be 
present the following day”); Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1359 (“Cadwalader refused to appear before 
Taney but sent a subordinate to inform the Chief Justice that Merryman was charged with 
treason . . . .”); Mark F. Leep, Ex Parte Merryman, in AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: THE DEFINITIVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION 603, 603 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2013) (“Cadwalader 
refused [to attend the May 27, 1861 hearing] and rebuffed a second demand to appear.”); infra notes 
38–45, and accompanying text.  
35
 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 323 (2014) 
(“The commandant, acting under Lincoln’s orders, refused to produce Merryman.”); HARTZ, supra 
note 1, at 16 (“When both Cadwalader and Lincoln himself refused to obey Taney’s [ex parte] order, 
Justice Taney decided the case against Lincoln . . . .”); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Lincoln the “Dictator,” 
55 S.D. L. REV. 284, 291 (2010) (“Notwithstanding Taney’s opinion, the military commander at Ft. 
McHenry, acting under the commander-in-chief’s orders, declined to produce Merryman.”); Klein & 
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C. When the United States Marshal attempted to serve an attachment order on 
Cadwalader at the Fort, Cadwalader sent the Marshal away;
36
 and finally,  
D. Cadwalader received authorization from Lincoln to ignore or defy the United States 
Marshal.
37
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Wittes, supra note 21, at 118 (“In response to Merryman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Chief 
Justice Taney . . . ordered Union General George Cadwalader to produce Merryman in federal court in 
Maryland. When Cadwalader defied the order . . . .”); Neely, supra note 29, at 52 (“Taney confronted 
the army colonel bringing word of General Cadwalader’s defiance.”); infra notes 46–60; see also, 
e.g., CHARLES GROVE HAINES & FOSTER H. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835–1864, at 457 (explaining that the Merryman incident 
“led to outright executive defiance of judicial authority”); Michal R. Belknap, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 82 
(1980) (“[W]hen Chief Justice Roger Taney . . . had ordered military authorities to deliver up a 
prisoner during the Civil War, they . . . defied his order . . . .”); David Cole, Judging the Next 
Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2571 
(2003) (“[T]he military refused to produce the petitioner.”); Tyler, Political Question, supra note 15, 
at 343 (“Likewise, [Lincoln] ignored Chief Justice Taney’s command in Merryman that a federal 
prisoner detained pursuant to presidential order be produced.”).  
36
 See, e.g., FRANK L. KLEMENT, THE LIMITS OF DISSENT: CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM & THE 
CIVIL WAR 69 (1998) (affirming, absent any on-point sources, that “Cadwalader refused to accept the 
writ [of attachment] and denied entrance to Fort McHenry to the marshal seeking to serve it”); DAVID 
M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 29 (2d ed. 1998) (affirming, absent any on-point sources, 
that the “General resisted Taney’s writ of attachment by directing that the marshal of the court be 
denied entrance to Fort McHenry”); 4 STATES AT WAR, supra note 6, at 313 (same); Douglas W. 
Kmiec, The Supreme Court in Times of Hot and Cold War: Learning from the Sounds of Silence for a 
War on Terrorism, 28(3) J. SUP. CT. HIST. 270, 273 (Nov. 2003) (noting that “Lincoln’s subordinate 
commander General Cadwalader barred the Court’s officer from even entering the fort where 
Merryman was held”); infra notes 61–63; see also, e.g., Cole, supra note 35, at 2571 (“Justice Taney 
then issued an attachment for contempt, but the military refused to accept service of that order.”); 
Rosen, supra note 15, at 149 n.704 (“[M]ilitary officers at Fort McHenry, Maryland, acting upon 
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, intentionally . . . barred from the fort the marshal who 
attempted to serve it.”).  
37
 See, e.g., United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 51 (D. Or. 1942) (Fee, J.) (“No designation need 
be given to acts which the military sometimes are required to commit under the stress of war and of 
military necessity, such as . . . the refusal of General Cadwalader under Lincoln’s order to obey the 
writ of the federal circuit court . . . .”), vacated, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 323 (2014) (“The commandant, acting under Lincoln’s 
orders, refused to produce Merryman.”); ROSS, supra note 4, at 67 (“Lincoln . . . ordered the army 
officer who had arrested Merryman to refuse to accept the writ.”); Hutchinson, supra note 35, at 291 
(“Notwithstanding Taney’s opinion, the military commander at Ft. McHenry, acting under the 
commander-in-chief’s orders, declined to produce Merryman. Thus, Abraham Lincoln defied a lawful 
order of the Chief Justice of the United States.”); infra notes 64–80; see also, e.g., EDWARDS & 
WAYNE, supra note 15, at 415 (“Taney ordered [Merryman’s] release, but Lincoln refused to give him 
up to the U.S. marshal sent to bring him into court. . . .” (emphasis added)); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A 
COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 207 & n.7 (2002) 
(“The only clear counterexample [of the executive duty to obey judicial orders] is President Lincoln’s 
instruction to his subordinates to disregard a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice 
Taney . . . .” (citing Merryman)); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1032 n.275 (2000) (“Lincoln’s instructions to 
ignore the order in Ex Parte Merryman . . . may be the most defiant . . . .” (citing Lincoln’s July 4, 
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These factual and legal assertions lack substantial merit.  
A. Did Cadwalader Ignore or Defy Chief Justice Taney by not Showing up for the 
First Day’s Hearing on May 27, 1861?
38
 
Anyone who has ever been a law clerk in a court with original jurisdiction over habeas 
matters knows that jailers who have responsibility over large institutions rarely personally 
attend habeas hearings, even though such jailers are the named defendant. As a civil or quasi-
civil matter,
39
 jailer-defendants are not obligated to attend habeas hearings in person. 
Customarily, such defendants send a representative (or, an attorney is sent for the named 
defendants by the government’s relevant law department).
40
 Here, Cadwalader sent Colonel 
Lee. No defiance here: full stop. Indeed, although Taney would initiate contempt proceedings 
against Cadwalader, the only reason Taney offered for those contempt proceedings was that 
Cadwalader failed to produce Merryman. Taney’s attachment order makes no mention of the 
fact that Cadwalader failed to attend the May 27, 1861 proceedings.
41
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1861 message to Congress, which took place more than a month after Merryman)); Rosen, supra note 
15, at 149 n.704 (“[M]ilitary officers at Fort McHenry, Maryland, acting upon Lincoln’s suspension 
of habeas corpus, intentionally disobeyed a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice 
Taney . . . .”).  
38
 See supra note 34.  
39
 See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corrs. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978) (Powell, J.) (“It is well settled 
that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.”); Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction 
Relief Alternatives and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
171, 198 (2003) (“Habeas corpus proceedings are usually treated as civil or quasi-civil 
proceedings . . . .”).  
40
 See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 41 (“Obviously, Colonel Lee [was] present not as legal counsel for 
the government but as a representative of Merryman’s custodian (General Cadwalader) . . . .”); see 
also 4 STATES AT WAR, supra note 6, at 312–13 (explaining that Lee was Cadwalader’s “ADC,” aide-
de-camp, and that Lee reported to the court that Cadwalader was “unavoidably detained”). But see 
Affairs in Baltimore, supra note 16 (failing to mention Colonel Lee, and, instead, reporting that 
“Major Belger” attended the hearing on May 27, 1861 for Cadwalader, and also reporting that Major 
Belger read Cadwalader’s response to the court), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1861/05/29/news/affairs-balimore-habeas-corpus-cask-return-sheriff-action-
chief-justice-taney.html.  
41
 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.) 
(ordering “an attachment forthwith [to] issue against General George Cadwalader for a contempt, in 
refusing to produce the body of John Merryman”). But see Stephenson, supra note 2, at 344 (“Taney 
issued an attachment for contempt against Cadwalader for failure to appear in court . . . .”). To be 
clear, Taney’s attachment order commanded the Marshal to attach Cadwalader’s (not Merryman’s) 
body, i.e., to bring Cadwalader to court where Cadwalader’s contempt would be adjudicated. See 27 
May 1861, Attachment issued by Clerk, Thomas Spicer, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND (BIOGRAPHICAL 
SERIES): JOHN MERRYMAN (1824–1881) (last visited Sept. 25, 2015), 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/pdf/attachment.pdf. 
But see ELLIS, supra note 18, at 413 (“[Taney] dispatched the court’s marshal to Fort McHenry under 
orders to bring Merryman to court by noon the next day.”); Louis Fisher, National Security Law: The 
Judicial Role, in FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW 203, 210 (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 2010) (“Prison 
officials [?], acting under Lincoln’s policy, refused to let Taney’s marshal serve a document at the 
prison to release Merryman.”); but see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF 
DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112 n.292 (2013) (same) (citing Fisher, supra at 
210).  
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What might defiance by the Army have looked like? If the Army had denied Merryman 
access to an attorney or had denied him access to his family, perhaps that would have been 
defiance.
42
 If the Army had arrested Merryman’s attorney, before or after the attorney 
petitioned Taney for a writ of habeas corpus, arguably, that would have been defiance. If the 
Army had closed the courthouse where the proceedings were being heard, or had seized 
pamphlets or newspapers publishing Taney’s opinion, then that would have constituted 
defiance. Had the Army seized Taney’s papers or Chief Justice Taney himself on his way to 
or from the courthouse, then that certainly could be fairly characterized as “defiance.”
43
 
Nothing like this happened in Ex parte Merryman.
44
  
                                                             
42
 See CHRISTOPHER PETER LATIMER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE STATE 89 (2011) (“Within hours of 
this detention, Merryman contacted lawyers who drafted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”); 
5 SWISHER, supra note 5, at 845 (“Merryman was given immediate access to counsel . . . .”); cf. 
MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 153 (“Merryman was treated well during the time he was in Fort 
McHenry. His family and friends were allowed to visit him and help him make plans for his 
future . . . .”); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 39 (noting, in relation to the period following the court 
proceedings, that Merryman “was permitted to see members of his family and numerous friends”). 
43
 See PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 76 (1994) (“It was grand 
drama, but Taney was not in danger.”); ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that after adjudicating 
Merryman, “Taney returned to Washington unmolested”); see also MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 151–
53 (discussing persistent rumors that Lincoln considered having Taney arrested, and characterizing 
such rumors as “strain[ing] credulity”); cf. DILORENZO, LINCOLN UNMASKED, supra note 29, at 92–
94 (arguing that Lincoln signed a warrant to arrest Taney, notwithstanding the inability to produce 
any such warrant). Furthermore, federal authorities arrested state judges during the Civil War. See 
Arthur John Keeffe, Practicing Lawyer’s Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 48 A.B.A. J. 491, 491 
(1962) (noting that Judge Bartol of the Maryland Court of Appeals and Judge Carmichael of the 
Maryland Circuit Court were arrested by federal authorities during the Civil War).  
44
 See Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1378 (“But compared to the trampling of civil liberties in other 
nations during civil wars, what happened under Lincoln seems almost innocent and naive. . . . 
Merryman’s arrest is astounding because he had access to an attorney. . . . This was a globally unique 
privilege for a civilian in military custody. That the army allowed Merryman’s attorney to travel from 
Baltimore to Washington in order to appeal directly to Taney, and then allowed Taney to hold court in 
Baltimore and openly challenge military authority, is in itself remarkable. No one later thought to 
interfere with Taney when he published his opinion castigating Lincoln. This could hardly happen in 
very many other places during a civil war.” (footnote omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). Professor 
Finkelman is engaged in hyperbole here. It is more than likely that a good many people, including 
Chief Justice Taney and some in the Executive Branch, thought about doing precisely these things, 
particularly because of a well known precedent which arose in connection with the War of 1812. 
General Andrew Jackson imposed martial law in New Orleans and arrested Louaillier, a member of 
the assembly, who had denounced Jackson in a letter in a newspaper. Judge Dominick A. Hall, a 
federal district court judge, intended to issue a writ of habeas corpus. See JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, 
THE LIFE OF JACKSON 225 (new ed. 1925) (“[Judge Hall] granted Louaillier’s request, stipulating that 
Jackson should have notice before the writ was served on him.”). Jackson’s response was a good bit 
more firm than Cadwalader’s and Lincoln’s—Jackson jailed Judge Hall. Cf. NEFF, supra note 12, at 
36 (characterizing Cadwalader’s response to Taney’s writ as “polite[]”); RANDALL & DONALD, supra 
note 16, at 302 (“[Cadwalader] showed no truculence toward the judiciary as did Jackson in the War 
of 1812 . . . .”). The federal district attorney sought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Judge Hall 
from a state judge, and General Jackson proceeded to jail both the district attorney and the state judge. 
See BASSETT, supra at 226; RANDALL, supra note 13, at 145 & n.10. Once martial law ended, Judge 
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Had Cadwalader sought to defy Taney what might he have done? Had he sent no one at all in 
response to the writ, or had Colonel Lee asserted in open court that the military authorities 
would not abide by the decision of the court, arguably, that would have constituted defiance. 
Nothing like that happened. Quite the opposite: Cadwalader and Lee asked for more time to 
prepare a defense.
45
  
B. Did Cadwalader Defy Taney by not Producing Merryman After Taney Granted 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus Directed to Cadwalader to Produce (but not Release) 
Merryman?
46
  
Merryman was seized by military authorities on Saturday, May 25, 1861. That very day, 
Merryman’s attorneys drafted a petition for habeas corpus, and presented it to Taney. On or 
about Sunday, May 26, 1861, Taney granted the petition in part: Taney ordered Cadwalader 
to produce (but not release) Merryman for a hearing to be held on Monday, May 27, 1861 at 
11:00 am. It is true that Cadwalader did not produce Merryman on May 27, as he was 
required to do by Taney’s order.
47
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Hall fined Jackson $1,000 for contempt of court. These events from the War of 1812 remained active 
in the public mind. See, e.g., MATTHEW WARSHAUER, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE POLITICS OF 
MARTIAL LAW: NATIONALISM, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PARTISANSHIP 197 (2006) (“Most let the issue 
of martial law rest [after Jackson died in 1845]. Yet it still remained in the minds of some.”). For 
example, in 1844, Congress remitted the fine for contempt Jackson had paid, and also paid Jackson 
interest. See RANDALL, supra note 13, at 145 & n.10. Although Taney would take a somewhat 
different view of the legality of suspending habeas corpus by presidential order in Merryman in 1861, 
“[i]n 1843, Chief Justice Roger Taney privately praised [former President] Jackson for his measures 
three decades earlier and condemned [Judge] Hall’s use of habeas corpus and his fine of Jackson.” 
Paul D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 673, 688 
(Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015); see Letter from Chief Justice Taney to Jackson (Apr. 28, 1843), in 6 
CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 1839–1845, at 216, 217 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1933) 
(“Future ages will be amazed that such conduct as that of Judge Hall could find defenders or 
apologists in the count[r]y, and how there could be any difficulty in stigmatizing the disgraceful 
proceeding in the manner it deserves.”); see also Letter from Chief Justice Taney to Jackson (Jan. 4, 
1844), in 6 id. at 250, 251 (“[I]f there is any thing upon which the people of this country have made 
up their minds, it is that the fine was most unjustly imposed . . . .”). If, as Professor Finkelman argued, 
President Lincoln never thought about interfering with Chief Justice Taney, then he was a fool. And 
Lincoln was no fool. See, e.g., Letter from President Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others (June 12, 
1863), in 8 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 33, at 298, 311–12 (reporting 
Lincoln’s discussion of the Jackson-Hall incident, including Lincoln’s noting that Jackson arrested 
Judge Hall and the lawyer who brought the habeas petition to Hall, and also Hollander, a third-party, 
who merely called Jackson’s conduct “a dirty trick” at a time when martial law had been imposed); 
supra note 43 (discussing rumors to the effect that Lincoln and the administration considered seizing 
Taney).  
45
 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144 (reproducing Cadwalader’s response which stated that 
Cadwalader “respectfully requests that you will postpone further action upon this case” until the 
President can be consulted).  
46
 See supra note 35.  
47
 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144; REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 33–34.  
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But all these preliminary proceedings—prior to the May 27, 1861 hearing—were ex parte: 
Merryman’s attorneys had been present before Taney, but not the government’s or 
Cadwalader’s attorney. The government was, at the very least, entitled to argue that the status 
quo should be preserved until it also had an opportunity to be heard and to put forward its 
defenses in court, i.e., that the President’s suspension put Merryman beyond judicial relief, 
including a grant of a writ of habeas corpus.
48
 Of course, I do not for a moment suggest that 
ex parte judicial orders need not be obeyed.
49
 But such preliminary ex parte orders are 
qualitatively different from other judicial orders, particularly final judicial orders,
50
 issued 
after notice and an opportunity to be heard in an adversarial hearing (or trial) on the merits.
51
  
                                                             
48
 Cf. KRENT, supra note 5, at 146 (“Without argument [from Cadwalader], Taney ordered the 
prisoner brought before him . . . .”); ROSEN, supra note 18, at 172 (asserting that, in Merryman, Taney 
“[r]efus[ed] to allow the government to be heard”). If Cadwalader had produced Merryman and also 
subsequently prevailed on the merits, then even such a favorable decision for Cadwalader and the 
government would have been little more than dicta in regard to the initial ex parte order, particularly 
if the decision had been fact-dependent and tied to Merryman’s specific conduct. In order to test 
judicially the legal validity of Taney’s initial ex parte order as a precedent for future cases, 
Cadwalader had to maintain a live adversarial controversy and the status quo. To put it another way, 
Cadwalader’s conduct should only be characterized as “defying” the courts if one assumes that 
individual jailer-defendants and the government should be denied a substantive opportunity to test 
judicially the power of the courts to issue ex parte habeas orders in the context of purported 
presidential suspension. Not surprisingly, the government was unwilling to throw in the towel before 
it had any opportunity to be heard.  
49
 I do not opine on the precise scope of what obedience is due judicial orders, ex parte or otherwise, 
issued by a court with competent jurisdiction. Compare, e.g., POWELL, supra note 37, at 207 
(“American executive officers must obey judicial orders, at least once affirmed at the highest level [of 
the judiciary].” (emphasis omitted)), and Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and its Discontents, 20 
CONST. COMMENT. 405, 423 (2004) (“[E]ven if Lincoln was defying Chief Justice Taney’s order on 
constitutional grounds, he was not defying an order of the Supreme Court, the judicial body that 
possesses ultimate judicial authority. . . . If there are degrees of executive defiance of judicial orders, 
ranging from disobeying a district judge to disobeying an appellate court to disobeying the Supreme 
Court, Lincoln’s defiance was at the lower end of the spectrum.”), with Merrill, supra note 15, at 59–
60 (“The problem . . . to paraphrase Gertrude Stein, is that a court is a court is a court. The Supreme 
Court, the courts of appeals, and the district courts all exercise the same constitutional power—the 
judicial power [of Article III]—and all conduct their affairs in fundamentally similar ways. . . . There 
are a number of practical differences between courts at different levels in the judicial system . . . . But 
these are at most differences in degree, and would not seem to justify treating the work product of 
courts at different levels in the judicial hierarchy as imposing a fundamentally different obligation on 
the executive branch.” (footnote omitted)). See generally infra note 81.  
50
 See, e.g., Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, supra note 15, at 1285 (“Lincoln’s denial of 
judicial supremacy [in Ex parte Merryman] extend[ed] . . . even to final judicial decrees in a 
particular case—breaking through the limits that Lincoln himself had declared as a Senate candidate 
responding to Dred Scott in 1857 and 1858, and which he had reaffirmed in his First Inaugural barely 
a month earlier.” (emphasis added)). But cf. STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT 
THE COURT: OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER 192 (2011) 
(arguing that Lincoln’s position in Dred Scott, his First Inaugural, and his response to Merryman were 
consistent in that they “highlighted the unsettled nature of the law on new questions and the 
plausibility of alternative interpretations, at least until a single interpretation congealed through 
repetitive announcement and enforcement”). Professor Paulsen’s abstract position is entirely correct: a 
party’s resisting a final judicial order issued after adversarial proceedings is far more significant than 
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Here, Cadwalader could have believed—in good faith—that after a brief hearing, his initial 
failure to comply should and would be excused.
52
 Indeed, as Chief Justice Taney explained: 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
a party’s merely violating a preliminary ex parte judicial order. Cf. Merrill, supra note 15, at 70 
(noting “consensus . . . that executive actors have a duty to enforce final judicial judgments, even if 
they disagree with their legal bases” (emphasis added)); id. at 43 & 46 (same, and again referring 
exclusively to “final” judgments). Unfortunately, Professor Paulsen nowhere explains how Lincoln 
(or the administration, or, indeed, anyone) violated or, even, could have violated Taney’s final judicial 
decree in Merryman. See supra note 16, and accompanying text (reproducing Taney’s final order). 
Indeed, Taney’s language was worded in such general and abstract terms that one might say it was 
impossible for the President to violate Taney’s order. For example, Taney stated: “It will then remain 
for that high officer [the President], in fulfilment of his constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the 
United States to be respected and enforced.” Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153 (emphasis added). 
But see Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, supra note 15, at 1287–88 (“Taney ordered General 
Cadwalader’s arrest and further directed that his opinions and orders immediately be transmitted to 
President Lincoln, with instructions that they be enforced.” (emphasis added)). Professor Paulsen’s 
characterization is not helpful because it was the nature of those “instructions” which was and remains 
at issue. Were they binding, and against whom or what entities? 
51
 Such a hearing, dealing solely with the merits of the government’s legal argument, would be 
adversarial as long as Merryman’s attorney was present, even if Merryman was not. Likewise, a 
federal prisoner bringing a modern statutory habeas action has a right to be present if an evidentiary 
hearing will be held or if facts are disputed. See Habeas Corpus Procedure, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 
1189–91 (1970). Taney would decide Merryman based on well known principles and precedents of 
public law, without regard to any specific facts related to John Merryman’s conduct. See, e.g., Ex 
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144 (“I ordered this attachment yesterday, because, upon the face of the 
return, the detention of the prisoner was unlawful . . . .” (emphasis added)). Chief Justice Rehnquist 
characterized Taney’s initial ex parte order as a modern “order to show cause.” See WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 66 (rev. ed. 2002). Likewise, Taney’s subsequent attachment 
order has also been characterized as an order to show cause. See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman: 
Proceedings of the Court Day, May 26, 1961, 56(4) MD. HIST. MAG. 384, 389 (Dec. 1961) 
(characterizing the “writ of attachment [as] requiring General Cadwalader to appear . . . to show cause 
why he should not be held in contempt”). In other words, when the attachment was issued, Taney had 
only decided that Cadwalader had violated his prior ex parte order, but liability for the purported 
contempt, and Cadwalader’s defenses, had not yet been adjudicated in adversarial proceedings. See 
infra note 52 (discussing Cadwalader’s potential defenses in regard to the contempt proceeding).  
52
 See Woods v. Jianas, 92 F. Supp. 102, 104 (W.D. Mo. 1950) (Reeves, C.J.) (“If, however, it shall be 
made to appear that the defendant is unable to comply with the order, then he should be discharged.”); 
Comment, The Application of the Law of Contempt to the Uphaus Case, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 732 
(1961) (“Inability to obey a court order is a good defense in all contempt proceedings.”). Cadwalader 
could have pled something akin to force majeure. See, e.g., 1 W. F. BAILEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES 458 (1913) (“[T]he situation [at the time Merryman was 
adjudicated] was peculiar. Many of the states were actually in armed rebellion against the general 
government. Maryland, while it had not in fact not seceded, was in a partial state of insurrection.”); 
REHNQUIST, supra note 51, at 66 (“[Union] [t]roops moving through [Baltimore] were stoned . . . .”); 
see also, e.g., 1 THE REBELLION RECORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS 239 (Frank Moore ed., 
N.Y., G.P. Putnam 1861) (reproducing May 14, 1861 letter from Major W.W. Morris, Commanding 
Fort McHenry, to Judge Giles, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, explaining 
the reasons for his inability to comply with the court’s writ of habeas corpus, including “[t]he 
ferocious spirit exhibited [in Maryland] toward the United States army would render me very averse 
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“I ordered this attachment [against Cadwalader] yesterday, because, upon the face of the 
return [i.e., Cadwalader’s response], the detention of the prisoner was unlawful . . . .”
53
 In 
other words, Cadwalader’s failure to obey the original ex parte order was only potentially 
sanctionable because his substantive defense had failed. Had Cadwalader’s defense 
succeeded, there would have been no possibility of contempt, notwithstanding his failure to 
obey the court order.  
 
Like many litigants faced with an ex parte temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction, Cadwalader was caught between a rock and hard place: he could waive a 
potentially meritorious defense by obeying the court order (i.e., by producing the prisoner), or 
he could preserve the status quo by putting forward a good faith defense on the merits. The 
latter strategy necessitated that he disobey the court order and that he refuse to produce the 
prisoner until the merits of his position had been judicially heard and determined. Such a 
strategy poses the risk of sanctions should it fail, but even if it fails, characterizing such a 
litigant or his strategy as “defying” the courts is grossly simplistic. This is true not merely 
because the context of Ex parte Merryman was civil war, but because all ex parte orders pose 
very basic challenges to principles, policies, and values relating to due process, traditional 
notions of justice and fair play, and natural justice.
54
  
 
To put it another way, Cadwalader could have believed that he was in possession of legal 
arguments unknown to Taney, i.e., unknown to Taney at the time he granted the initial ex 
parte order after having heard only Merryman’s side of the dispute. The factual basis of this 
claim is not unsupported. Cadwalader’s response explained to the court that the President 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
from appearing publicly and unprotected in the city of Baltimore to defend the interest of the body to 
which I belong” (emphasis added)).  
53 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144 (emphasis added).  
54
 See, e.g., Anton Piller KG v Mfg. Processes Ltd., [1976] Ch. 55, 60 (Eng. C.A.) (Lord Denning, 
M.R.) (“[T]he [ex parte] order sought in this case is not a search warrant. It does not authorise the 
plaintiffs’ solicitors or anyone else to enter the defendants’ premises against their will. It does not 
authorise the breaking down of any doors, nor the slipping in by a back door, nor getting in by an 
open door or window. It only authorises entry and inspection by the permission of the defendants. The 
plaintiffs must get the defendants’ permission. But it does do this: It brings pressure on the defendants 
to give permission. It does more. It actually orders them to give permission—with, I suppose, the 
result that if they do not give permission, they are guilty of contempt of court.” (emphasis added)); id. 
at 62 (Ormrod, L.J.) (“The form of the [ex parte] order makes it plain that the court is not ordering or 
granting anything equivalent to a search warrant. The order is an order on the defendant in personam 
to permit inspection. It is therefore open to him to refuse to comply with such an order, but at his peril 
either of further proceedings for contempt of court—in which case, of course, the court will have the 
widest discretion as to how to deal with it, and if [in adversarial proceedings on the merits] it turns out 
that the order was made improperly in the first place, the contempt [by the plaintiff seeking the order] 
will be dealt with accordingly . . . .” (emphasis added)); supra note 20 (collecting authorities). Would 
any rational person characterize a litigant, who refuses to obey an ex parte Anton Piller order, as 
having “defied” the courts? If not, then there is little reason to characterize Cadwalader—who made a 
difficult legal decision in the middle of an ongoing civil war—in such a manner. Reasonable judges 
and commentators in the context of adjudicating contempts (as in other contexts) have always 
distinguished between those who err in good faith (even assuming Cadwalader erred) from those who 
actively choose to defy court orders.  
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gave military officers discretion to suspend habeas corpus.
55
 Taney, in his written opinion, 
filed some days later, stated: “No official notice has been given to the courts of justice, or to 
the public, by proclamation or otherwise, that the president claimed this power [to suspend 
habeas], and had exercised it in the manner stated in the return [i.e., Cadwalader’s 
response].”
56
  
 
Ultimately, Taney would reject Cadwalader’s defense on the merits. But the failure of a 
defense does not establish that Cadwalader acted in bad faith or that he sought to ignore the 
court—nor does the failure of a defense establish that Cadwalader intended to defy court 
orders, nor does it establish that Cadwalader believed that he was authorized by Lincoln or by 
anyone else to ignore or defy actual court orders. To suggest otherwise, to suggest that 
Cadwalader sought to ignore or defy court orders, based on nothing more than the extant 
meager record of the decision in Merryman, is to engage in myth-making.  
 
What about May 28, 1861? Taney had rejected Cadwalader’s defense in open court on May 
27, 1861. One could fairly assume that this was known to Cadwalader because Cadwalader’s 
representative, Colonel Lee, had attended the May 27, 1861 hearing, and at that hearing, 
                                                             
55
 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144.  
56
 Id. at 148. Note that Chief Justice Taney expressly denied the existence of any presidential 
proclamation suspending habeas corpus. See id.; Carroll, supra note 16, at 530 (explaining that “[n]o 
[public Executive Branch] proclamation was issued” concurrently with Lincoln’s military orders 
suspending habeas); Yoo, Merryman and Milligan (and McCardle), supra note 15, at 247 (same). But 
see DIRCK, supra note 26, at 99 (characterizing Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus as a 
“proclamation”); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 26 (characterizing Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 order to 
General Scott as a “proclamation”). An alternative possibility is that even absent a presidential 
proclamation, Taney was aware, in general terms, of Lincoln’s suspension order, but is complaining 
only of not having received “official” notice, including the specific scope of the suspension, and an 
explanation of the constitutional or statutory basis for the President’s action. See Ex parte Merryman, 
17 F. Cas. at 148 (explaining that “[n]o official notice ha[d] been given to the courts”). Compare 
ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 21 (explaining that Taney went from Baltimore to Washington to 
adjudicate Merryman “in full knowledge of the President’s [prior] order of April 27” authorizing 
General Scott to suspend habeas corpus), with NAPOLITANO, supra note 7, at 44 (“This order was not 
made public; rather, it was confined to executive secrecy.”), NEELY, supra note 6, at 9 (“No one 
informed the courts or the other civil authorities [in regard to the April 27, 1861 order].”), 
REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 41 (“Taney’s hasty decision is all the more remarkable because he had 
only learned at the Monday session [May 27, 1861] of the Court of the existence of the presidential 
proclamation [purporting to suspend habeas corpus].”), White, A New Word, supra note 6, at 359 
(stating that Taney, as of May 26, 1861, was “[u]naware that Lincoln had suspended the writ”), and 
Yoo, Merryman and Milligan (and McCardle), supra note 15, at 247 (“Neither Lincoln nor [General] 
Scott publicized the [April 27, 1861 presidential] order, nor did they issue it as a public proclamation, 
nor was it sent to the courts or Congress at the time.”), with BRIAN R. DIRCK, LINCOLN AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 75–76 (2012) (“Few people in Maryland—even local judges—were aware of what 
Lincoln had done.”), and JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO, PRAGMATISM, POLITICS, AND PERVERSITY: 
DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY BATTLE 220 (2012) (explaining that when Cadwalader’s 
response was read in open court, “Lincoln’s habeas corpus suspension . . . became widely known for 
the first time”). See generally infra note 68 (noting competing views in regard to martial law in 
Maryland as early as April 1861, including a contemporaneous New York Times article).  
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Taney ordered the Marshal to serve the attachment against Cadwalader.
57
 (The Marshal 
attempted to serve the attachment the next morning.) Should Cadwalader have produced 
Merryman the next day, on May 28, 1861 or thereafter? The answer here is surprisingly 
murky (even assuming Cadwalader had a duty to obey court orders in circumstances, such as 
here, where the President had already authorized the suspension of habeas corpus). On May 
27, 1861, after Cadwalader failed to comply with the original writ of habeas corpus to 
produce Merryman, Taney indicated that he would issue an attachment against Cadwalader. 
The attachment only ordered the Marshal to attach the body of General Cadwalader. But 
Taney’s attachment order did not direct Cadwalader (or Lee, the Army, the President, or 
anyone else) to comply with the prior writ to produce Merryman. At that point, the focus of 
the litigation shifted from the lawfulness of Merryman’s incarceration to Cadwalader’s 
purported contempt. Indeed, the courtroom drama of May 28, 1861 was about the United 
States Marshal’s inability to serve the attachment, not the underlying merits of Cadwalader’s 
(or the government’s) position.  
 
Apparently, the attachment was issued as a remedial order to correct Cadwalader’s initial 
failure to produce Merryman. Cadwalader could have stopped that remedial process by 
complying or, at least, offering to comply with the original writ, or he could have opposed the 
attachment on the merits. What defense Cadwalader might have put forward (if any) is 
impossible to know because: (i) the Marshal was unable to serve the attachment the next day, 
May 28, 1861; (ii) federal law officers (who should have advised and represented 
Cadwalader) at the start of a new administration and amidst a civil war were 
“disorganized;”
58
 and (iii) Taney terminated the judicial proceedings the very same day
59
 
(without granting the government a sought-after adjournment). By May 29, 1861, with the 
termination of live in-court judicial proceedings, the attachment became a nullity,
60
 and any 
further compliance by Cadwalader with the original ex parte order was not feasible. 
Cadwalader’s defiance—if it is properly so characterized—lasted all of one day—May 28, 
1861—during a civil war. Is there really anything of consequence to be learned from this 
                                                             
57
 One report of the Merryman litigation indicates that Colonel Lee left the May 27, 1861 hearing 
prior to Taney’s announcing (from the bench) that he will order the attachment against Cadwalader. 
See The Case of Merriman [sic], N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1861, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1861/05/28/news/the-case-of-merriman.html. So it is just possible that 
Cadwalader did not have timely information about Taney’s attachment.  
58
 REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 40–41.  
59
 See The Habeas Corpus Case of John Merryman, Esq., THE SUN, (Morning) May 29, 1861, at 1 
(“Here the Chief Justice concluded his remarks, and the case, as far as the judicial process is 
concerned, is closed.”), available at 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/pdf/sun29may1861.pd
f; see also United States Court, Important Proceedings, The Case of John Merryman, Esq., THE SUN, 
(Morning) May 28, 1861, at 1, available at 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/pdf/sun28may1861.pd
f.  
60
 See Philip A. Hostak, Note, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm 
Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 181, 185 & n.26 
(1995) (“[I]f the underlying controversy giving rise to a civil contempt action is settled or is otherwise 
terminated, the contempt proceeding becomes moot, and the sanctions must end.” (citing Gompers v. 
Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911) (Lamar, J.))).  
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event? And why are so many willing to ascribe Cadwalader’s one-day’s noncompliance to 
President Lincoln?  
C. When the United States Marshal Attempted to Serve an Attachment Order on 
Cadwalader at Fort McHenry, the Marshal was sent away—has Anyone 
Established that it was Cadwalader who sent the Marshal away from the 
Fort?
61
  
The United States Marshal in Merryman, who attempted to serve the court’s attachment order 
on Cadwalader, reported that: “I sent in my name at the outer gate [of the Fort]; the 
messenger returned with the reply, ‘that there was no answer to my card,’ and therefore, I 
could not serve the writ, as I was commanded. I was not permitted to enter the gate.”
62
 
Neither the Marshal’s affidavit, nor the standard histories of the case support any inference 
that Cadwalader gave the order to send the Marshal away. We do not know where 
Cadwalader was on the morning of Tuesday, May 28, 1861. We do not know who received 
the Marshal’s card from the guards at the gate, nor do we know why that person failed to 
respond to the card, nor do we know why the Marshal was not admitted. Many have guessed, 
and undoubtedly, Cadwalader may have been involved, if not in control of these events.
63
 But 
no one has put forward any document or record supporting the inference that it was 
Cadwalader who was responsible. Perhaps Chief Justice Taney believed Cadwalader was 
responsible; perhaps he genuinely believed that this moment was a defining Cromwellian 
civil-military confrontation. But if Taney and Taney’s intellectual successors would also have 
us believe this, then they must proffer some evidence to support their position. Precisely what 
is that evidence?  
                                                             
61
 See supra note 36.  
62
 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144. The reported case states that the United States Marshal, 
Washington Bonifant, told the court that he went to the Fort to serve the attachment. However, in a 
colloquy with Taney reported in a contemporaneous newspaper account, Bonifant specified that it was 
his deputy, Mr. Vance, who went to the Fort to serve the attachment. See The Habeas Corpus Case: 
Gen. Cadwallader Refuses To Allow The Process Of The Court To Be Served Upon Him, THE SOUTH, 
(Evening) May 28, 1861, at 2, available at 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/pdf/south28may61.pdf
. It is interesting to note that this newspaper’s lead article on the front page in the left most column 
was by Congressman Clement Vallandigham. Id. at 1. See generally Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 
(1 Wall.) 243 (1863) (Wayne, J.). It might be asked, given the facts, as announced by Bonifant and 
Vance, whether this was a serious attempt to serve the attachment on Cadwalader. See, e.g., Charles 
Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1280 (1942) 
(“A token attempt thereupon to attach General Cadwalader for contempt came to naught, of course, at 
the gate to the fort.”).  
63
 See supra note 36 (collecting authorities); see also, e.g., BURNS, supra note 12, at 65 (“The chief 
justice said his marshal might well have ordered a posse . . . .” (emphasis added)); ELLIS, supra note 
18, at 413 (describing the U.S. Marshal as “the court’s marshal”); PALUDAN, supra note 43, at 76 
(describing Bonifant as “the court’s marshal”); Kmiec, supra note 36, at 273 (noting that “Cadwalader 
barred the Court’s officer from even entering the fort”); cf., e.g., Louis Fisher, supra note 40, at 210 
(“Prison officials [?], acting under Lincoln’s policy, refused to let Taney’s marshal serve a document 
at the prison to release Merryman.”). Note how these commentators describe the United States 
marshal as the “court’s” or “Taney’s” functionary. But see infra note 65 (explaining that United States 
marshals are better characterized as Executive Branch functionaries, albeit, whose regular duties 
include, among others, the enforcement of judicial orders).  
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D. Is it True that Cadwalader Received Authorization from Lincoln to Ignore or 
Defy the United States Marshal?
64
 
There are those commentators who argue that Cadwalader received authorization from 
Lincoln to defy the United States Marshal and, by implication, to defy the courts. These 
commentators point to three instances where Lincoln spoke to this subject or, at least, so they 
believe. They point: (i) to Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 order granting military authorities 
discretion to suspend habeas corpus; (ii) to a May 28, 1861 order from E.D. Townsend, 
Assistant Adjutant-General, directing Cadwalader to hold prisoners without regard to court 
orders; and (iii) to Lincoln’s July 4, 1861 message to Congress, which, among other subjects, 
addressed the issue of habeas corpus.  
 
It must be noted at the outset that the common problem with each of these three positions is 
that they make little sense. Both the United States Marshal and General Cadwalader worked 
for President Lincoln; both were subordinate Executive Branch officers; both held their 
positions at the pleasure of the President.
65
 The Marshal was a civil officer; Cadwalader, a 
military officer. In these circumstances, if Lincoln wanted to avoid friction between the 
Marshal and Cadwalader, if Lincoln wanted to stop the Marshal from serving the attachment, 
if Lincoln wanted to insulate Cadwalader from Taney’s judicial orders, then all Lincoln had 
to do was direct the Marshal not to serve the attachment. Moreover, if the Marshal refused to 
accede to Lincoln’s instructions, then Lincoln also had the additional option of removing the 
Marshal. The idea that Lincoln would have knowingly engineered this purported civil-
military confrontation, between two officers responsible to him, seems fairly odd. Why 
would Lincoln have authorized Cadwalader to ignore an otherwise lawful court order, when 
                                                             
64
 See supra note 37.  
65
 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (providing “[t]hat a marshal shall be 
appointed in and for each district for the term of four years, but shall be removable from office at 
pleasure”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“It may truly 
be said [that the courts] have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”); see also Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-five Years, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 1337, 1342 (1999) (arguing “contra United States v. Nixon[,] [418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Burger, 
C.J.)], that the President of the United States must have the final say as to all matters concerning the 
execution of the laws of the United States by officers of the executive branch”); id. at 1390–97 
(same). The Judiciary Act does not expressly state who has the power to appoint and to remove 
marshals. However, the Act was passed on September 24, 1789, and, on that very day, President 
Washington sent eleven nominations for marshal to the United States Senate. See 1 S. Exec. J., 1st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 28–29 (1789) (reproducing Washington’s September 24, 1789 nominations for 
multiple positions created under the Judiciary Act); see also 4 STATES AT WAR, supra note 6, at 500 
n.331 (explaining that the United States Marshal who attempted to serve the attachment, Washington 
Bonifant, was appointed to the Marshal’s office by Lincoln in 1861). Indeed, Bonifant was appointed 
to the Marshal’s office by Lincoln twice in 1861: first, in April 1861, as a recess appointment, and 
then again, after Merryman, with Senate confirmation. See 11 S. Exec. J., 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 441 
(July 13, 1861) (indicating prior recess appointment along with a nomination to the post); id. at 474–
75 (indicating July 22, 1861 confirmation). Bonifant has been described as a “leader” or “founder” of 
the Republican party in Maryland. See 4 STATES AT WAR, supra note 6, at 500 n.331 (describing 
Bonifant as a “leader” of the Republican party in Maryland); WARTIME WASHINGTON: THE CIVIL 
WAR LETTERS OF ELIZABETH BLAIR LEE 50 n.16 (Virginia Jeans Laas ed., 1999) (characterizing 
Bonifant as a “founder” of the Republican party in Maryland). 
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he had open to him the much easier path of controlling or removing the officer—the United 
States Marshal—whose actions were necessary to give that judicial order lawful effect 
(through service of process)? Moreover, given that Lincoln did not use his supervisory
66
 or 
removal power over the Marshal to arrest the process of the courts,
67
 should not these 
commentators, instead of asserting that Lincoln threatened the rule of law as embodied by the 
normal conventions of judicial process and traditional inter-branch comity, take the position 
that Lincoln’s conduct—on this occasion—left the courts both free to exercise decisional 
independence and also free to issue and serve court orders?  
 
President Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 Suspension of Habeas Corpus. Lincoln issued an order to 
General Scott. The order stated: 
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United 
States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line which is now or 
which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington 
you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at 
the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend the writ.
68
  
                                                             
66
 See, e.g., Letter from President Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others (June 12, 1863), in 8 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 33, at 298, 313 (“And yet, let me say that, in 
my own discretion, I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandingham 
[sic]. While I cannot shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a general rule, the commander 
in the field is the better judge of the necessity in any particular case. Of course I must practise a 
general directory and revisory power in the matter.”). The error in spelling—“Vallandingham” should 
be “Vallandigham”—appears to be made by Nicolay & Hay, the Complete Works’ editors, not by 
Lincoln. The same might also be said for the editors’ use of “practise” rather than “practice.” See 
Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others, [June] 1863, AMERICAN MEMORY: THE ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (last visited July 30, 2015) (displaying Lincoln’s 
original letter), http://tinyurl.com/nrs4ho6 (copy #1), and http://tinyurl.com/p7oa57j (copy #2).  
67
 See also United States ex rel. Murphy v. Porter, 27 F. Cas. 599 (C.C.D.D.C. Oct. 31, 1861) (No. 
16,074a) (Dunlop, C.J.) (describing circumstances where a deputy United States Marshal was 
instructed by other Executive Branch officials not to serve a judicial attachment order on a military 
officer); RANDALL, supra note 13, at 162–63 (discussing Murphy); cf. 1 LETTERS OF JOHN HAY AND 
EXTRACTS FROM DIARY 46, 47 (1908) (reporting diary entry of October 22, 1861). Even in Murphy 
complex and unresolved questions remain as to the scope of precisely what authority the Executive 
Branch claimed to validly exercise. In Murphy, the Executive Branch arrested the process of the 
Circuit Court. However, an Executive Branch decision to arrest the process of the courts—without 
more—is not coterminous with an Executive Branch decision to oust (or, to ignore, or to defy) the 
courts from adjudicating the validity of the (primary or, arguably, logically prior) decision not to serve 
judicial process. As in Merryman, Murphy left this issue unresolved.  
68
 6 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1860–1861, at 258, 258 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay 
eds., N.Y., The Lamb Publishing Co. new ed. 1894) (reproducing Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 order to 
General Scott delegating authority to suspend habeas between Philadelphia and Washington). But see 
Schroth et al., supra note 4, at 1011 (“Lincoln told General Winfield Scott . . . that the writ of habeas 
corpus was suspended . . . .” (emphasis added)). A slightly different report of the order can be found 
in RAGSDALE, supra note 2, at 36. Arguably, Lincoln gave Scott authority to suspend habeas as early 
as April 25, 1861. See 6 COMPLETE WORKS, supra at 255, 256 (reporting Lincoln’s April 25, 1861 
order to General Scott). Furthermore, on July 2, 1861, Lincoln gave Scott authority to suspend habeas 
again, but with broader geographic authority. Id. at 295, 295–96 (reproducing Lincoln’s July 2, 1861 
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Lincoln’s order meant, at least, that the military had authority to arrest, seize, and detain 
individuals suspected of treasonous activity, and that if the detained person brought judicial 
proceedings in regard to the arrest etc., then the military personnel could put in a good faith 
defense or otherwise plead valid authorization by the President under the Suspension 
Clause.
69
 Did Lincoln also intend that his order was a direction to military commanders to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
order to General Scott delegating authority to suspend between New York and Washington). 
Professor Stone has argued that: “On April 27, to restore order in Baltimore and to enable Union 
forces to protect Washington, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared martial law 
in Maryland.” Stone, supra note 6, at 220; see also BERKIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 333 (“Lincoln and 
General Scott ordered the military occupation of Baltimore and declared martial law . . . .” (bold 
omitted)); BURNS, supra note 12, at 66 (explaining that after Merryman was announced “Lincoln 
continued to impose martial law”); POWE, supra note 5, at 119 (asserting that Lincoln had declared 
martial law in Maryland prior to Merryman’s arrest); Jan Ellen Lewis, Defining the Nation: 1790 to 
1898, in SECURITY V. LIBERTY: CONFLICTS BETWEEN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 117, 147–48 (Daniel Farber ed., 2008) (“[Lincoln] imposed martial law in 
Maryland to protect troop movements . . . .”); Schroth et al., supra note 4, at 1011 (affirming that 
“Lincoln declared martial law in Maryland”); cf. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 4, at 287 
(noting that martial law was declared in Baltimore on May 13, 1861); Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1478 
(“[A]t most Lincoln thought that the State of Maryland where John Merryman was arrested was in a 
state of martial law in the spring of 1861 . . . .”); Fallon, Executive Power, supra note 15, at 2 (“At 
stake in Merryman was the constitutional authority of the President to declare martial law . . . .”); 
Affairs in Maryland; Martial Law Enforced in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1861, at 1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1861/04/25/news/affairs-in-maryland-martial-law-enforced-in-
baltimore.html (“A system of martial law exists in both [Washington and Baltimore], but it was not 
officially proclaimed.”). See generally NEFF, supra note 12, at 40–44 (expounding on similarities and 
differences between the suspension of habeas and martial law); CARY STACY SMITH & LI-CHING 
HUNG, THE PATRIOT ACT: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 79 (2010) (distinguishing martial law from 
the suspension of habeas corpus); Maurice G. Baxter, Book Review, 53 IND. MAG. HIST. 95, 96 (1957) 
(reviewing DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT (1956)) (distinguishing suspension of 
habeas corpus from martial law); id. at 97 (distinguishing suspension from military trial); Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1370 
n.241 (2015) (same); Stone, supra note 6, at 220 n.22 (same). The basis for Professor Stone’s 
position, i.e., that Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 order “declared martial law,” is obscure. Professor 
Fallon’s position—that martial law was at issue in Merryman—is difficult to square with the fact that 
“martial law” is not discussed anywhere in Taney’s opinion. Professor Mark E. Neely, Jr. has taken 
the position that “Lincoln did not say so, but [General] Scott assumed he could delegate the authority 
[to suspend habeas corpus] to others.” NEELY, supra note 6, at 9. Neely’s position is odd: Lincoln’s 
order gave Scott express authority to subdelegate to other officers. Furthermore, even absent such 
express authority, Scott’s authority to subdelegate was implied. Cf. Jason Marisam, The Interagency 
Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 897 (2012) (“[I]n the absence of clear congressional language to 
the contrary, high-level agency officials can usually subdelegate authority to lower level officials or 
subagencies within the [same] agency.”).  
69
 See Marcus McArthur, Abraham Lincoln and Treason in the Civil War: The Trials of John 
Merryman by Jonathan W. White, 3(4) J. CIVIL WAR ERA 589, 590 (Dec. 2013) (“[Professor] White 
introduces another important layer of complexity to the already complex story by observing the threat 
that such ‘arbitrary’ arrests posed to the arresting officers. While the danger of such arrests to civilians 
is obvious, White explains that federal officials faced numerous civil suits toward the end of the war 
and into Reconstruction by civilians seeking damages for their alleged wrongful arrests. According to 
White, the broader significance of the Merryman case is that ‘government officials, both in their 
official capacity and as private citizens, needed protection from civil suits for actions they had taken 
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ignore or defy judicial orders granting habeas should the courts hear and determine that 
Lincoln had no authority to suspend habeas?  
 
These two issues—authority to suspend habeas and authorization to ignore or defy judicial 
orders—are related, but they are not the same.
70
 Those commentators, who point to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
while in office or the military service’.” (citation omitted)); see also Ex parte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 
174 (N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292) (Hall, J.) (“Such a suspension may prevent the prisoner’s discharge; 
but it leaves untouched the question of the illegality of his arrest, imprisonment, and deportation. If 
these are unlawful, the marshal and others engaged in these arrests are liable in damages in a civil 
prosecution; such damages to be assessed by a jury of the country. Besides this civil liability, the 
parties engaged in making this arrest, and carrying the prisoner out of the state, and beyond the 
protection of its officers and tribunals, may, perhaps, be subject to criminal punishment.”); cf. MAJOR 
GENERAL SIR ERNEST DUNLOP SWINTON (nom de plume OLE LUK-OIE), An Eddy of War, in THE 
GREEN CURVE AND OTHER STORIES 213, 236 (1909) (“[A] war has not taken place in England 
since—the Lord knows when, and our population, even the best intentioned, are so ignorant about 
what it really means, that our troops have been severely handicapped. . . . Why, I have heard that 
during the first few days [of the foreign invasion] the soldiers were chary of trespassing, and that it 
took a lot of persuading to make them enter any preserved woods . . . . But we are learning: and now 
that martial law has been declared—only after a hot debate, mind you, even though the enemy was in 
England—people are realising what ‘War’ is. We are doing better.” (emphasis added)); Elbridge 
Colby, Book Review, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1931) (reviewing CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE LAW 
OF MARTIAL RULE (1930)) (“[M]ilitary men are as uncertain as the civilians are fearful, what are the 
real powers under ‘martial law.’”). But compare FARBER, supra note 15, at 192 (“The law of the time 
did not recognize any good faith defense to a damage action based on an illegal official act.”), with 
James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and 
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1928 (2010) (explaining 
that during the antebellum period “Congress provided relatively routine indemnification for officers 
acting in good faith [and within the scope of their agency relationship, contract, or instructions]”).  
70
 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.) (“I 
understand that the [P]resident not only claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus himself, 
at his discretion, but to delegate that discretionary power to a military officer, and to leave it to him to 
determine whether he will or will not obey judicial process that may be served upon him.” (emphasis 
added)); Richard A. Posner, supra note 15, at § 7, p. 10 (“Farber slides too easily from the question of 
whether Lincoln was authorized to suspend habeas corpus to whether he was authorized to flout Chief 
Justice Roger Taney’s order granting habeas corpus, as he did. Officials are obliged to obey judicial 
orders even when erroneous.”); see also Ex parte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. at 174 (“Such a suspension may 
prevent the prisoner’s discharge; but it leaves untouched the question of the illegality of his arrest, 
imprisonment, and deportation.”); cf. Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 
Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 90 (1861) (Bates, A.G.) (“If by the phrase the suspension of the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus, we must understand a repeal of all power to issue the writ, then I freely admit 
that none but Congress can do it. But if we are at liberty to understand the phrase to mean, that, in 
case of a great and dangerous rebellion . . . the public safety requires the arrest and confinement of 
persons implicated in that rebellion, I as freely declare the opinion, that the President has lawful 
power to suspend the privilege of persons arrested under such circumstances.” (second emphasis 
added)); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 37 (“But habeas corpus does not speak at all to the sort of 
justifications that a court will deem sufficient to remand the prisoner to custody, rather than to order 
him discharged.”). But see STEPHANIE COOPER BLUM, THE NECESSARY EVIL OF PREVENTATIVE 
DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A PLAN FOR A MORE MODERATE AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION 
92 (2008) (“By eliminating the writ, detainees could not challenge the legality of their respective 
detentions.”); DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 299 (1995) (explaining that Lincoln’s April 27, 
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President’s order as evidence that Lincoln authorized Cadwalader to defy the courts, do not 
meaningfully grapple with the ambiguous language in Lincoln’s order. Moreover, in his 
response, Cadwalader presented a defense on the merits; he never hinted that the President’s 
suspension order stripped the courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas actions or that military 
officers were not obliged to obey the courts. Indeed, Cadwalader sought an adjournment in 
order to get further guidance as to his defense.
71
 Why would Cadwalader have told Taney that 
he would seek further guidance and why seek further guidance if he already believed 
Lincoln’s order stripped the courts of the power to lawfully compel obedience in habeas 
actions? Similarly, Taney wrote: “It is possible that the officer who has incurred this grave 
responsibility may have misunderstood his instructions [from the President], and exceeded 
the authority intended to be given him.”
72
 Thus, it appears that even Taney was somewhat 
unsure what the intended scope of Lincoln’s order was.  
 
One is faced with two possible interpretations of Lincoln’s order. The first gives it a limited 
scope going to initial arrest and extending a defense to military officers carrying out those 
arrests. The second interpretation is far more ambitious and suggests that Lincoln intended to 
exclude judicial review of Executive Branch determinations in the habeas context. One would 
think that any adoption of the second view would require a reasonably strong basis in fact. 
But Lincoln’s statement is ambiguous. It is not clearly supported by either Cadwalader’s 
conduct or Taney’s opinion. As a matter of judicial construction, when faced with an 
ambiguous order, one which excludes the courts and one which does not, the latter should be 
favored. For example, in Ex parte Beck, the court explained: 
Respondent [the United States] suggests, somewhat significantly, the court is 
bound to say, that his superior officers order him to hold petitioner, and that to 
disobey may subject him to punishment, even that of death; that, if this court 
grants habeas corpus ordering him to release petitioner, respondent will be very 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1861 order meant that “[s]uch persons [who were arrested] could be detained indefinitely without 
judicial hearing and without indictment, and the arresting officer was not obliged to release them 
when a judge issued a writ of habeas corpus”); CHRIS EDELSON, EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL POWER: 
FROM THE DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 34 (2013) (“Scott was 
authorized to arrest and indefinitely detain people he deemed dangerous without permitting them 
access to a court to challenge their detention.”); but cf. Stone, supra note 6, at 220 n.22 (“[A]n 
individual held unlawfully can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asking a court to determine 
whether the detention is lawful. Suspension of the writ of habeas corpus disables courts from 
intervening in this process.”); Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties: Then and 
Now, in LINCOLN REVISITED: NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE LINCOLN FORUM 251, 254 (John Y. Simon et 
al. eds., 2007) (“With suspension of the writ, this immediate judicial review [i.e., habeas corpus] 
becomes unavailable.”). Chief Justice Taney and Judge Richard Posner are entirely correct to 
distinguish the two issues: lawful authority to suspend habeas corpus, and lawful authority to exclude 
all judicial review in regard to habeas corpus after such a purported suspension. Still, how Chief 
Justice Taney concluded that Lincoln authorized anyone to defy the courts is unexplained. Likewise, 
how Judge Posner concluded that Lincoln disobeyed, much less “flout[ed],” any order issued by 
Taney is unclear.  
71
 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144. 
72
 Id. at 153; see, e.g., NEFF, supra note 12, at 36 (“Perhaps, Taney speculated, General Cadwalader 
had exceeded his instructions, thereby relieving the President of any personal blame.”). But see supra 
note 70 (quoting Chief Justice Taney’s Merryman opinion, which laid the blame on Lincoln). 
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embarrassed, in that obedience to either will be disobedience to the other. It is not 
understood that the orders to respondent are other than general, to imprison all 
deserters. It is not understood any order to respondent even hints to him to 
disobey a decree of any court of the United States—a decree that within its 
jurisdiction is the law of the land, therein to be held inviolate, to be executed and 
obeyed by military and civilians alike, so long as it is unreversed.
73
 
The same reasoning ought to apply in Ex parte Merryman. Because Lincoln’s order does not 
squarely address the issue of whether he intended to exclude the courts, it is unreasonable to 
suggest he intended to do so—particularly where contemporaneous coordinate evidence does 
not clearly support the conclusion that he attempted to exclude the courts. 
 
Assistant Adjutant-General, E.D. Townsend’s May 28, 1861 Order. Townsend, writing from 
Army headquarters in Washington, sent Cadwalader an order. Townsend’s order stated: 
The general-in-chief [Winfield Scott] directs me to say under authority conferred 
upon him by the President of the United States and fully transferred to you that 
you will hold in secure confinement all persons implicated in treasonable 
practices unless you should become satisfied that the arrest in any particular case 
was made without sufficient evidence of guilt. In returns to writs of habeas corpus 
by whomsoever issued you will most respectfully decline for the time to produce 
the prisoners but will say that when the present unhappy difficulties are at an end 
you will duly respond to the writs in question.
74
  
This order was dated May 28, 1861. This was the second and final day on which hearings 
were conducted in Merryman, and also the day in which the Marshal unsuccessfully sought to 
serve the attachment order on Cadwalader at the Fort sometime prior to noon.  
 
No one has put forward any document or record establishing that Cadwalader was already in 
receipt of Townsend’s May 28, 1861 order prior to the time the Marshal had been sent away 
from the Fort. Townsend’s order may have been drafted after noon, or the order may only 
have arrived in Cadwalader’s hands (assuming it ever arrived) after the Marshal had already 
left the Fort. Indeed, telegraph lines to Washington had been cut.
75
 Absent further evidence, 
                                                             
73 245 F. 967, 972 (D. Mont. 1917) (Bourquin, J.) (emphasis added); see also Bowen v. Mich. Acad. 
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (Stevens, J.) (“We begin with the strong presumption 
that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.”). See generally Nicholas Bagley, The 
Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2014); Paludan, supra note 2, at 10 
(“With all this discretion what strikes modern historians is how respectful Lincoln was of 
constitutional limitations on the extent of his power.”).  
74
 Letter from E.D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, to 
Major General G. Cadwalader (May 28, 1861), in 1 (series 2) THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A 
COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 576, 576–77 
(Washington, Government Printing Office 1883).  
75
 See MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 67 (“Merryman ordered his men to cut the telegraph lines . . . .”); 
REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 22 (“Not only were no [United States] troops arriving [in Washington], 
but the telegraph lines had been cut and mail deliveries from the north were irregular.”); cf. Stone, 
supra note 6, at 220 (“Union soldiers seized John Merryman, a cavalryman who had allegedly burned 
bridges and destroyed telephone [?] wires during the April riots.”). Our records of this time are 
incomplete. It is true that telegraph lines to Washington had been cut, but not every such line had been 
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there is no good reason to suggest that Cadwalader or anyone else relied on this order in 
regard to any decision to send the Marshal away from the Fort. Indeed, there is some good 
reason to believe that this order was not in Cadwalader’s hands at the time the Marshal was 
sent away from the Fort. The order expressly directed Cadwalader to “most respectfully 
decline for the time to produce the prisoners” and also to “say that when the present unhappy 
difficulties are at an end you will duly respond to the writs in question.” Here, the Marshal 
was sent away from the Fort without any answer; this (in)action by the military authorities at 
the Fort is not consistent with Townsend’s order.  
 
But the more important point is there is no reasonable way to connect Townsend’s May 28, 
1861 order to Lincoln, and this is the core issue. Lincoln gave the Army discretion to suspend 
habeas, but he did not clarify if he intended to deny such detainees the opportunity to 
judicially contest the legality of the suspension itself. It is hardly surprising that—faced with 
an emergency—the Army interpreted Lincoln’s ambiguous order in a maximalist fashion, but 
that tells us little about what Lincoln intended or meant to achieve by giving the Army 
discretion to suspend habeas. Simply put, what a military subordinate (i.e., Townsend) thinks 
or believes, even when acting under higher military authority (i.e., General Scott), as here, 
does not establish what President Lincoln intended or meant.
76
 Of course, as a political 
matter, Lincoln remained responsible for what his Executive Branch subordinates did.
77
 But 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
cut. Telegraph lines between Washington and Baltimore (or the Fort itself) may have been intact on 
May 28, 1861; likewise, telegraph lines which had been cut by Merryman and others may have been 
repaired by that date.  
76
 See, e.g., Ex parte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1, 5 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4761) (Smalley, J.) (ascribing an 
order directing the United States Marshal to resist court orders to the “war department,” and not to the 
President, and further concluding that “[a] more flagrant disregard of the [C]onstitution of the United 
States can hardly be conceived”); Ex parte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 161–62 (N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 
1292) (Hall, J.) (“My personal confidence in the integrity, patriotism, and good sense of the president, 
as well as the respect due to the high office he holds, compels me to require the most conclusive 
evidence upon the point before adopting the conclusion that he has ever deliberately sanctioned so 
palpable a violation of the constitutional rights of the citizens of the loyal states as the order of the 
war department, thus construed, would justify and require.” (emphasis added)). Notice that both 
Judge Smalley and Judge Hall construe the disputed orders as war department orders, as opposed to 
assuming—absent on-point evidence—that the orders were directly authorized by the President. See 
also infra note 77 (distinguishing, on the one hand, the President’s legal and moral responsibility in 
regard to disputed conduct by subordinate Executive Branch officers from, on the other hand, the 
administration’s responsibility). 
77
 Compare WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 38–39 
(1998) (“The administration continued to confine Merryman at Fort McHenry . . . .” (emphasis 
added)), and Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal 
Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 117 (1998) (noting that the “the Lincoln administration had defied 
Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman” (emphasis added)), with Judge Shira A. Scheindlin & 
Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1605, 1614 (2004) (“Although the court issued the writ, in a true show of 
presidential hubris Lincoln simply ignored the decision, keeping Merryman detained in Fort McHenry 
until he was subsequently indicted for conspiracy to commit treason.” (citing REHNQUIST, supra at 
38–39)), Captain Robert G. Bracknell, All The Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime, 47 NAVAL 
L. REV. 208, 213 & n.19 (2000) (reviewing REHNQUIST, supra) (“Lincoln ordered Merryman’s 
continued imprisonment at Fort McHenry.” (citing REHNQUIST, supra at 38)), and Eric L. Muller, All 
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that abstract political responsibility under the Take Care Clause
78
 is worlds apart from 
establishing that Lincoln actually authorized his subordinates (through the military chain of 
command) to ignore or defy court orders.
79
 
 
President Lincoln’s July 4, 1861 Message. In his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln 
stated:  
Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the 
commanding general in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, 
without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he 
might deem dangerous to the public safety.
80
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
The Themes But One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1999) (reviewing REHNQUIST, supra) 
(“Rehnquist notes that Lincoln ignored Taney’s order and [he] refused to release Merryman . . . .” 
(citing REHNQUIST, supra at 38)). Notice how Chief Justice Rehnquist diffuses responsibility to the 
“administration,” but the reviewers argue that Rehnquist laid responsibility for Merryman’s continued 
detention directly at Lincoln’s door. See also supra note 76 (distinguishing the “war department” from 
the President, and also expounding on the evidentiary standard necessary before finding the President 
responsible for the war department’s conduct).  
78
 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause); BRUFF, supra note 6, at 135 (“When the 
military refused to delivery up Merryman, the frustrated Taney sent the record to Lincoln, who bore 
ultimate responsibility for the refusal.”); supra note 66 (discussing presidential supervisory authority). 
If Professor Bruff meant only that Lincoln was politically responsible for his military subordinates, as 
the President is responsible for the conduct of all his subordinates, such a claim is both obviously true 
and largely unimportant. But if, instead, Professor Bruff meant that Lincoln was legally or morally 
responsible for Cadwalader’s failure to comply with Taney’s ex parte order or opinion, or that Lincoln 
directly authorized Cadwalader’s noncompliance, then among other things, Bruff would have to make 
both a factual and a legal showing. Bruff would have to show that Lincoln had actual knowledge of 
Taney’s order prior to the end of the litigation, or Bruff would have to show that Taney’s ex parte 
order or attachment order had continuing legal effect after the close of litigation, or Bruff would have 
to show that Lincoln’s orders were intended to preclude or, fairly construed, precluded all judicial 
review in the habeas context.  
79
 But see, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 35, at 291 (“Notwithstanding Taney’s opinion, the military 
commander at Ft. McHenry, acting under the commander-in-chief’s orders, declined to produce 
Merryman. Thus, Abraham Lincoln defied a lawful order of the Chief Justice of the United States.” 
(emphasis added)). Even assuming that the Chief Justice was acting here for a court with jurisdiction, 
a matter actively contested to this day, there is no good reason to ascribe Cadwalader’s purported 
lawlessness to Lincoln unless there is some showing that Lincoln’s orders were intended to authorize 
or, fairly construed, authorized Cadwalader to ignore or defy court orders. It appears that such 
evidence is lacking in the extant literature. See, e.g., supra note 78.  
80
 6 COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 68, at 297, 308–09 (reproducing Lincoln’s July 4, 1861 message 
to Congress in special session). Because Lincoln’s July 4, 1861 message post-dated Cadwalader’s 
conduct, it makes little sense to suggest that Cadwalader relied upon Lincoln’s message. For the same 
reason, it makes little sense to suggest that Cadwalader actually relied upon federal statutes which 
post-dated Merryman proceedings. See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 
12 Stat. 755 (granting, subject to limitations, the President power to suspend habeas corpus); Act of 
Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, 12 Stat. 326 (ratifying, after the fact, prior presidential actions). A general 
discussion of the scope of Congress’ post-Merryman statutes relating to habeas is beyond the scope of 
this Article. The literature on this subject is quite uneven. Compare, e.g., CLINTON L. ROSSITER, 
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It is difficult to understand how Lincoln’s message to Congress authorized (or, even, 
functionally authorized) Cadwalader’s ignoring or defying the courts in relation to Merryman 
proceedings. First, responsible civilian officers in the American system of government do not 
customarily find, seek, or justify their official actions based on political speeches, 
communications, or messages. A fortiori, Cadwalader—a military officer during an actual 
rebellion—would not rely on Lincoln’s message here, nor would he rely on any other such 
political communication.  
 
Second, Merryman judicial proceedings in open court ended on May 28, 1861, although the 
formal opinion was not filed until June 1, 1861. Lincoln’s July 4, 1861 message post-dated 
the Merryman opinion by more than a month. So, in fact, Cadwalader could not have relied 
on Lincoln’s message to Congress during the actual litigation. At most, Lincoln’s message 
might have ratified Cadwalader’s conduct after the fact, assuming Lincoln spoke with the 
requisite degree of clarity in regard to the precise issue.  
 
But Lincoln did not speak with the requisite degree of clarity. Lincoln’s message only argues 
that the President had the power to suspend habeas corpus and to arrest and detain persons 
without use of “ordinary” judicial processes. But Lincoln does not clarify if he also intended 
or meant for subordinate Executive Branch officers to ignore or defy courts should the courts 
decide that the suspension itself was unconstitutional. Like his prior orders to General Scott, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 230 (1948) 
(“Congress, faced by a fait accompli that was in its nature irrevocable [in respect to President Lincoln 
and his administration’s pre-July 4, 1861 actions], registered approval of ‘all the acts, proclamations, 
and orders of the President respecting the army and navy of the United States and calling out or 
relating to the militia or volunteers from the United States’ in an act of August 6, 1861.”), with Nasser 
Hussain & Austin Sarat, Introduction, Responding to Government Lawlessness: What Does the Rule 
of Law Require, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 1, 15 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010) 
(“Congress, faced with a fait accompli, could only register its retroactive approval of the 
proclamations and orders of the president.” (citing ROSSITER, supra) (emphasis added)). Hussain and 
Sarat’s use of “only” seems woefully unsupported: congressional silence was also a possibility. 
Likewise, Taney could have issued an order mandating Merryman’s release; Taney chose not to do so. 
Cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law after the 
Bush Administration, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW, supra at 183, 193 & n.65 (“Even if 
it [the Supreme Court] lacked the physical force to end the abuse [by the President in relation to the 
exercise of purported war powers], its declaration at least would absolve loyal people from the legal 
or moral duty of obedience to its decree.” (quoting Justice Jackson’s draft opinion in Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting))); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, 
International Law as Interpretive Norm, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 99TH ANNUAL MEETING AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 192, 195 (2005) (“Even if a court’s decision is ignored by the 
President, it servers a valuable function by forcing him to justify his actions politically in the face of a 
judicial decision to the contrary.”). But see ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: 
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 162 n.165 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1993) (characterizing Taney’s 
“insistence upon jurisdiction” in Merryman as “courageous”); id. at 161 (analogizing “Taney’s 
resistance to Lincoln” to “Lord Coke’s resistance to King James”); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese 
American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 189, 211 (1945) (characterizing Taney’s actions in 
Merryman as “heroic”); Note, The Espionage Cases, 32 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 & n. (1919) 
(“During the Civil War, when a real menace to personal liberty presented itself, the judges fearlessly 
applied the law.2” (citing Merryman)).  
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Lincoln’s message to Congress lacks the requisite degree of clarity in regard to the core issue 
which most interests us. Simply put, we do not know what Lincoln intended, what he meant, 
how he was understood by actors at the time, or how a reasonable person at the time would 
have understood him.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lest there be any confusion . . . some have argued that the President—in certain 
circumstances—has an independent power to interpret the Constitution, and a concomitant 
power to ignore or defy court orders if the President comes to a good faith conclusion that the 
courts have erred.
81
 This Article has not opined on the correctness of this departmentalist 
                                                             
81
 See, e.g., Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, supra note 15, at 1290 (“Lincoln’s position was 
not, and could not be, limited to the stance that the President could refuse to implement judicial 
decisions in cases of ‘clear’ judicial error, or ‘clear’ disregard for the Constitution, or of ‘atrocious’ 
decisions, in legal or moral terms. His position, as expressed by his (in)action, was that the President 
was not bound to obey and enforce judicial decrees that he believed were incorrect, whenever 
circumstances suggested complying with the decision would be in some meaningful way harmful to 
important national interests.”); Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5 passim; see also, e.g., 
Calabresi, supra note 15, at 1434–35 (“The President is obligated to execute all court judgments 
absent a clear mistake, even those that concern the scope of his constitutionally rooted executive 
privilege.”).  
My own view is that absent a statute clearly mandating that the President enforce court orders, the 
President has no duty to execute court judgments beyond the abstract duty, imposed by the 
Constitution’s Take Care Clause, to supervise his Executive Branch subordinates. See U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 3; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 n.27 (1982) (Powell, J.) (requiring an 
“explicit” statement from Congress before applying statute to President); Memorandum from William 
H. Rehnquist, Asst. Att’y Gen., for the Honorable Egil Krogh, Staff Assistant to the Counsel to the 
President, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Closing of Government Offices in Memory of Former 
President Eisenhower 3 (Apr. 1, 1969) (on file with author) (“[S]tatutes which refer to ‘officers’ or 
‘officials’ of the United States are construed not to include the President unless there is a specific 
indication that Congress intended to cover the Chief Executive.”). Given the truly enormous scope of 
the Executive Branch, particularly during war time, and the many competing demands on the 
President’s time, his responsibility to control any one of his many subordinates is quite attenuated. His 
duty under the Take Care Clause is notional or aspirational, and generally only subject to control via 
regular elections and impeachment. I.e., political controls. The President’s duty under the Take Care 
Clause is not properly subject to judicial oversight absent clearly established bad faith. E.g., receiving 
a bribe from a foreign official, etc. However, if the President is an actual party in a litigation, then 
additional or different considerations may apply depending on the circumstances. There is nothing 
simple about these questions which touch on issues relating to political obedience at the root of our, 
and indeed of any, legal system. See generally supra note 49. Still there is no good reason to conflate, 
on the one hand, the President’s limited aspirational duty to supervise his Executive Branch 
subordinates who have direct responsibility to enforce court orders against third parties, with, on the 
other hand, his concrete personal duty to obey court orders when he is an actual party—either in an 
official capacity or in an individual capacity—in litigation. Cf. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 
153 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.) (“It will then remain for [the President], in fulfilment 
of his constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine what 
measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and enforced.” 
(quoting Take Care Clause)). But see Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, supra 
note 20, at 720 (suggesting that, in Merryman, the “executive and military were in effect parties to the 
case” (emphasis added)); Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 929 (“Taney . . . ordered the government to show 
cause why Merryman should not be released. A representative of the commandant appeared in court 
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view. This view may be the best or the correct understanding of the original public meaning 
of the Constitution, and it may not. Instead, this Article makes only the more limited claim 
that Merryman and what we currently know about Cadwalader’s and Lincoln’s actions in 
connection with the Merryman litigation, what preceded it, and its aftermath—all are too 
ambiguous to lend support to a strong departmentalist view of the Constitution. It may be that 
there is support for a Merryman power,
82
 but wherever that support may be, it is not to be had 
in Ex parte Merryman. 
 
That said, Civil War documents may be newly unearthed or rediscovered. For example, if 
tomorrow a military record were discovered establishing that Cadwalader gave the command 
to turn the United States Marshal away from Fort McHenry and that he gave that command 
after having received Townsend’s order, there would be no reason to be surprised. And if 
tomorrow a military record establishing just the opposite were discovered, there would be no 
reason to be surprised either. Likewise, if tomorrow a letter or other document were found 
from Lincoln disavowing any intent to defy judicial orders in the habeas context, it should not 
be a cause for surprise. And if tomorrow a letter or other document were found from Lincoln 
robustly authorizing just such defiance,
83
 there would be no cause for surprise either. The 
historical record we have today lacks the requisite clarity to reach a considered judgment in 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
for the government to advise Taney that the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). It appears that William Meade Addison, the United States Attorney for the District 
of Maryland, attended the Merryman proceedings. See MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 11 & 177 
(reporting Addison’s attendance); Downey, supra note 2, at 277 n.13 (same). I see no indication that 
Chief Justice Taney offered Addison any opportunity to be heard, nor do I see any indication that 
Addison sought any such opportunity. See BRUFF, supra note 6, at 135 (explaining that Taney issued 
his opinion “[w]ithout inviting the executive’s lawyers to argue their side of the case”); ELLIS, supra 
note 18, at 413 (asserting that Taney reached his decision “without giving the administration an 
opportunity to justify its suspension”); MCGINTY, supra note 5, at 177 (“[Taney] did not give the 
United States district attorney an opportunity to express the government’s position on the critical 
question before the court . . . .”); REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 40 (noting that Taney decided 
Merryman “without benefit of hearing argument from counsel”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST 
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 172 (2006) (asserting that, in Merryman, 
Taney “[r]efus[ed] to allow the government to be heard”); JENNIFER L. WEBER, COPPERHEADS: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF LINCOLN’S OPPONENTS IN THE NORTH 223 n.35 (2006) (“Taney . . . made the 
ruling alone . . . and without ever hearing arguments on behalf of the government.”). This is some, 
albeit limited, indication that neither the “executive” nor the “government” was a party in Merryman.  
82
 See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5 passim.  
83
 I note that when Lincoln wished to break with constitutional norms and expectations, he did so 
openly. For example, he once directed a United States Treasury official to withhold an Article III 
judge’s pay. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”), with Letter from William H. Seward, Secretary of 
State, to Elisha Whittlesey, Esq., First Comptroller of the Treasury (Oct. 21, 1861), in 2 (series 2) THE 
WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND 
CONFEDERATE ARMIES 1022, 1022 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1897) (reproducing 
Seward’s directive to Whittlesey, per Lincoln’s instructions, that Judge William M. Merrick’s salary 
should not be paid). At this time, Merrick was suspected of treason. See id. at 1021–23 (recording 
Merrick-related correspondence). See generally Jonathan W. White,‘Sweltering with Treason’: The 
Civil War Trials of William Matthew Merrick, 39(2) PROLOGUE 26 (Summer 2007).  
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regard to what Lincoln intended and meant and how he was understood by his subordinates 
and the wider public when he gave the Army discretion to suspend habeas corpus. One reason 
the record may lack such clarity is that, during the Merryman litigation and in its immediate 
aftermath, President Lincoln might never have given this specific legal question any thought 
at all.
84
 Of course, the other reason we lack clarity is that Chief Justice Taney never ordered 
Lincoln, or anyone else, to release John Merryman.  
                                                             
84 Cf. REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 48–49 (discussing Murphy v. Porter); supra note 67 (same). 
Murphy v. Porter concluded on October 31, 1861: this was some five months after Taney had filed his 
Ex parte Merryman opinion. See supra notes 1 & 66, and accompanying text.  
